Saturday, December 05, 2009

Watch out for Dubai Debris

By Eric Jackson
TheStreet.com Senior Contributor

12/3/2009 2:04 PM EST

What a difference a week makes. Last week, as we huddled over turkey and gravy, most of us worried about the contagion effect a Dubai World bond default might hold for similar sovereign and corporate debt and worldwide equities. A quick news release earlier this week saying the amount of debt at risk was less than initially feared and some soothing words from the U.A.E. central bank about providing liquidity was enough to buck up market spirits.


We've had an upbeat week so far. But what lies ahead?

Although we'll know more in the next two weeks about what actually happens with the Dubai World default, it's clear this is a company in need of cash. That could mean a quick sale of easy assets -- no matter what its creditors finally decide.

[To read the full post on RealMoney.com, click here.]

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Friday, December 04, 2009

Eric Jackson & Rob Curran of the Wall Street Journal discuss Shareholder Activism and the Web

I recently chatted with Rob Curran of the Wall Street Journal about "Shareholder Empowerment" using the web. I talk about my 2007 Yahoo! campaign, fighting Terry Semel, and what other smaller investors should think about if they're considering launching their own activist campaign to unlock shareholder value.

The audio interview is linked to here.

The original WSJ article is here.

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Wednesday, December 02, 2009

WSJ: Small Investor, Bigger Voice

Five ways the Internet is giving individual stakeholders more influence in the boardroom

DECEMBER 3, 2009

By ROB CURRAN

Technology keeps making it easier for the small investor to be heard.

Thanks to the Web, shareholders have not only more information, but more ways to share news, ideas and issues about the companies they invest in. Message boards, blogs and email have all amplified the voice of investors to the point where it's no longer necessary to be a mogul to get the company's ear. Technology, in the form of online shareholder voting, has even thrown open the doors to annual meetings.

Here are five ways the Internet gives small stakeholders a greater voice in the boardroom.

1. Participate in Annual Meetings and Conference Calls.

In May, Intel Corp. became the first major company to allow shareholders on the Web to vote and submit questions as if they were on the floor of the annual meeting. Moreover, a handful of small companies, including furniture seller Herman Miller Inc., have saved money by switching to "virtual" shareholder meetings instead of renting halls (although some critics have questioned the value of sacrificing personal interaction for the sake of increased participation).

Other companies, such as Wal-Mart Stores Inc., beam live video and Twitter updates from their meetings. As of late November, about 40,000 people had watched the video stream of Wal-Mart's June meeting, says Carol Schumacher, vice president for investor relations. Wal-mart says it hasn't allowed remote-participation in its annual meetings so far, saying it lacks the capacity to answer questions from online viewers in addition to those from attendees.

Quarterly earnings calls, a function once reserved for industry insiders, are showing signs of opening up as well. In March, digital-display maker Microvision Inc. began using its corporate blog to solicit questions from retail investors for its quarterly call, in effect opening the call up to any interested party with a computer. Matt Nichols, the director of communications for Microvision, says shareholders that frequented the company's investor-relations blog had asked for a way to participate in the calls.

"As technology improves…the opportunity for participation is there," says Brad Barber, a professor of finance at University of California Davis and the director of the Center for Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Responsibility. "I think what's missing is interest in participation." He adds: "Reducing the cost of participation is part of this, [but there's] also engaging the shareholder to show them they can have influence and power."

2. Don't Just Watch—Vote.

While it's nice to open up annual meetings to more people, it's the votes that count. Starting this year, the Securities and Exchange Commission required publicly traded companies to give investors the option of voting their proxy ballots online. In theory, this could be an easier way of voting than filling out the proxies and returning them in the mail. But online voters still have to punch in codes.

Employees of institutional money manager TFS Capital recently launched a side project, Moxy Vote, an independent venture that intends to mobilize retail investors by simplifying the voting process and providing information on the issues at stake. By visiting Moxy Vote, investors can see where advocates stand on corporate elections and also view a running tally of votes.

There are two ways to use the site for voting. Investors can visit Moxy Vote and punch in the code from the proxy they received in the mail. Or, if an investor registers and provides his or her brokerage account number, Moxy Vote officials say no more codes will be necessary. In this case, the member receives an e-mail notification of a coming ballot from a company in his or her portfolio, then clicks through to moxyvote.com. On the home page, the member will see short explanations of the issues at stake in every coming vote—whether it's a director election or a resolution on energy-efficiency standards.

The member will also see the recommendations of advocacy groups on the site. Once cast, the vote is processed by Moxy Vote partner Broadridge Financial Solutions Inc., which has long tabulated voting for many U.S. companies. The members can align themselves with one of the 14 advocacy groups that have signed up so far.

3. Use the Message Boards, but Be Skeptical.

One of the places where shareholders exchange information most freely is on the message boards, or chat rooms, for publicly traded companies on Web sites such as Yahoo Finance. Postings can include transcripts of revealing conference calls, links to news articles and even legal documents with an impact on a company's earnings.

Be aware that bulletin boards attract persons who are mainly trying to boost or deflate stocks, sometimes by using fraudulent information. Advice on penny stocks, those worth $5 or less, should be taken with an extra pinch of salt.

Users may do well to independently verify information they find on message boards. If a message refers to a damaging SEC filing, try to find that filing on the SEC Web site (sec.gov). If a news article is mentioned, look for the article on the Web site of the news provider. And don't be reluctant to ask questions of the companies themselves.

"The Internet is a wonderful tool for providing information, but the dark side of the Internet is it's a wonderful tool for providing misinformation," says Professor Barber at UC Davis.

One good information source that's not linked to a particular company is Shareowners.org, a nonprofit advocacy group for small shareholders. More than 400 activists regularly post updates on their causes on the site or through links, says the group's chairman, Richard Ferlauto. The site also allows users to petition Congress on financial-reform issues. An issue that's currently hot, Mr. Ferlauto says, is a proposal that would force companies to include dissident board candidates on proxy information sent through the mail. Currently, proxy materials only have to name a company's own candidates for board seats.

4. Keep Up With the Blogs. Or Start One.

Business and financial blogs have multiplied in recent years, providing platforms for shareholder activists, industry insiders and corporate officers alike.

Eric Jackson, a blogger, shareholder activist and managing partner of Naples, Fla.-based Ironfire Capital LLC, conducted an online campaign to reform Yahoo Inc. in 2007, a time when many shareholders were upset about the stock's performance and company business model.

Mr. Jackson, who says he had fewer than 100 Yahoo shares at the time, rallied support by listing "nine points" for Yahoo's improvement on his blog, posting video on YouTube.com, and creating a Facebook page. Eventually he won the public support of roughly 100 shareholders and spoke at the annual meeting, although Yahoo says his points were never part of the official agenda. Still, many shareholders voted against the board at that meeting, and a week later, Chief Executive Terry Semel quit.

Mr. Jackson and his supporters represented a tiny portion of the total votes, and weren't the only shareholders unhappy with the performance of the board—proxy advisory firms also advocated votes of no confidence. Still, Mr. Jackson believes that Internet campaigns like his do have an effect. To be successful, would-be campaigners need to target companies with a high profile and be prepared to invest a lot of sweat equity, he says.

Some corporations, such as Dell Inc., maintain investor-relations blogs, one of the few venues outside press releases where companies discuss financial information—while staying within the bounds of SEC fair-disclosure rules. Unlike press releases, the blog entries also give readers an opportunity to interact with the corporate officers.

Nell Minow is editor and cofounder of the Corporate Library, a nonprofit that campaigns for better corporate governance. The organization uses its blog (www.blog.thecorporatelibrary.com) to help push reforms through Congress and to awaken small shareholders to the dangers of apathy. The government, Ms. Minow wrote in July, should "remove obstacles that currently prevent oversight from those who are best qualified and motivated to manage risk—the shareholders."

5. You Can Always Try Email.

Ms. Schumacher, the Wal-Mart executive, estimates her department receives roughly 100 emails a week from shareholders and tries to answer as many as possible. Investors can try to reach top executives and directors directly as well, even if their email addresses aren't public. Use a search engine to find email addresses of employees at the company. Then use the same convention with the name of the executive. For example, if you see an example such as j.smith@company.net, try to reach the executive using their first initial and last name. Try different combinations until the message doesn't bounce back.

But sometimes old-fashioned ways are best. "When I want to get hold of a CEO, I send a certified letter," says Mr. Barber. "That way, I get something signed to say they got it."

— Mr. Curran is a writer in Texas. He can be reached at reports@wsj.com.

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Bank of America Must Remove Ghost of Hugh McColl from Board

By Eric Jackson, Senior Contributor

12/02/09 - 01:02 PM EST

Stock quotes in this article: BAC

NEW YORK (TheStreet) --

Reports are out today that several of the candidates under consideration for the top job at Bank of America(BAC Quote) have called on the board to consider breaking up the bank. They are having none of it. As a result, the CEO search for Ken Lewis' replacement continues.

All in all, you would have to give the board of Bank of America an "F" for how they've monitored management and succession planning since a firestorm enveloped the company last Fall.

Primarily blame for the lack of preparedness the board has shown to having a successor for Ken Lewis waiting in the wings lies at the feet of Hugh McColl, Lewis' predecessor. McColl has really shaped what Bank of America has grown into. It won't change until his ghost leaves the board by having directors he appointed step down.

On a "Frontline" episode from last year describing the financial meltdown, McColl, who is still the bank's chairman, recounted how he'd masterminded turning the small NCNB National Bank of North Carolina into the Bank of America juggernaut. He said that, as a company, "you're either growing or you're dying."

He took that advice to heart and did a series of acquisitions of companies to create a national titan in banking. And that's why it's unlikely this bank will break itself up now or while McColl is still around. It's just not in their corporate DNA.

Bank of America is the house the Hugh built. He hand-picked his board to be his lapdogs. He hand-picked his successor, Lewis, to carry on exactly in the fashion he had led the bank.

Lewis didn't miss a beat. In fact, he took it up a notch, making increasingly bigger acquisitions. Lewis' tenure as CEO will be defined by his acquisitions of MBNA, Fleet Bank, Countrywide, and Merrill Lynch. The bank is now enormous.

Yet, Lewis didn't like how he was treated by the government and the press. He was used to being seen as Ken the Conqueror, not a lightning rod for criticism. So, he decided to take his ball and go home. His decision to quit after the summer left the board completely flat-footed.

Succession planning is only something a company is judged on when they do it badly. The fact that Bank of America is now having such a hard time filling the top spot signals how poorly equipped this board was to do scenario planning.

It's a pretty basic question that every board must always think about: what would we do tomorrow if the CEO got hit by a bus? Most of the time, there are two to three internal candidates' names which easily come to mind. Nine times out of 10, a board would rather select an internal candidate for the knowledge of the company, industry, customers, and employees who will be able to take the company forward.

All of the largest banks in America appear to have done a poor job of internal talent development, but Bank of America is by far the worst. Why?

At the end of the day, the bank's directors were charter members of the "Friends of Hugh" club. Their primary job as a director was to rubber-stamp whatever Hugh wanted to do. If Hugh didn't bring up the issue of succession planning, it didn't need to be considered.

That's why, starting after the spring shareholders' meeting (at which there were several directors who received large numbers of "against" votes) the Federal Reserve has started reassembling the board of directors. That's something we first started mentioning here over the summer.

This revamped board was still not able to get an effective succession process in place to prepare for Lewis' surprise departure. They should entertain all kinds of scenarios such as breaking up the bank. In my view, it epitomizes a "too-big-to-fail" financial institution and hasn't demonstrated that it can manage the disparity and scope of so many businesses.

If the Fed really wants to see the company change though, it should remove all directors who have ties to Hugh McColl. Once that happens, this board will start to rethink how this bank should be run from a truly fresh perspective. And they’ll probably conclude it does need to be broken up.

At the time of publication, Jackson did not have any position in the stock mentioned.

Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.

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Facebook's Dual Class Shares a Folly

By Eric Jackson, Senior Contributor

12/02/09 - 06:02 AM EST

Stock quotes in this article: YHOO , GOOG , MSFT , WPO , NYT

Facebook announced last week before the Thanksgiving holiday that it has created a dual-class share structure.

If you are an existing shareholder, your shares now have 10 times the voting power of any subsequently issued shares. It's widely viewed as a precursor move to holding an IPO in the next year or two.

Facebook has tried to cloak the announcement in language of "ensuring the company can continue to focus on the long term to build a great business." But, make no mistake, this is a pure power grab by founder Mark Zuckerberg to avoid being accountable, while raising money on the cheap.

Mark Zuckerberg
Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook CEO

Dual-class share structures are good for enriching and entrenching management but bad for public shareholders, as companies using these structures tend to underperform their peers over time.

Mark Zuckerberg is no Jeff Bezos, Larry Ellison or Steve Jobs. He's nowhere close -- for the moment. He's a guy who started a social Web site that wasn't as creepy as MySpace was at the time. It has become the de facto standard for social networking with traffic that almost surpasses Yahoo! (YHOO Quote).

Congratulations to him and the many talented employees there. However, there are many warning signs -- in addition to this new dual-class structure -- about how Zuckerberg runs the company that should give pause to investors considering buying into a future Facebook IPO.

First, there was the legal controversy surrounding the founding of Facebook. Remember the Winkelvoss brothers at Harvard who claimed Zuckerberg had copied their ConnectU site (which they'd hired Zuckerberg to do some work on) back at Harvard?

That claim, after dragging on for year, was settled out of court for $65 million at the time (although that number fluctuates with the current valuation of the company, as it was partly paid in Facebook stock). We'll never really know the truth around what happened back at Harvard, but we do know they had a legitimate claim that they pursued for several years and that it was never dismissed.

More worrisome about the long-term health of the company is that there has been a steady stream of senior executives surrounding Zuckerberg who've exited the company over the past three years. If there were one or two, you could chalk it up to someone's personal situation or "pursuing new opportunities."

When there are 13 departures, it's fair to ask what are they running away from. Co-founders Dustin Moskovitz, Chris Hughes, Andrew McCollum, and Eduardo Saverin; COO Owen Van Natta; CFOs Gideon Yu and Mike Sheridan; Marketing VP Matt Cohler; President Sean Parker; CTO Adam D'Angelo; VP of Product Development Doug Hirsch; VP of Sales Tricia Black; and VP of Engineering TS Ramakrishnan. Mark Zuckerberg is the common denominator.

When a former employee was asked about this, he responded:

Is there a common thread to the ... people leaving? ... One shared sentiment ... is that Mark is a very demanding person to work for; if you screw up, one day you are in, the next day out, persona non grata. Some folks chalk that up to immaturity on Mark's part."

Sheryl Sandberg was brought in from Google (GOOG Quote) to be Facebook's COO in March 2008. At the time, the move was spun as an older, senior executive coming to help the 25-year-old CEO. Yet, it doesn't appear that Zuckerberg's power as CEO or his intention to remain as CEO for the foreseeable future have lessened since Sandberg's arrival.

It is a bit of an awkward position for Sandberg to be in. She's senior, yet she has no real power. In the meantime, she reports to someone 15 years younger. It would make sense if she were promised a deal to get the brass ring at some specified date in the future (and maybe such a deal exists), but it certainly appears that "Zuck" isn't going anywhere for now.

There were some rumors around Sandberg's departure from Google being more about moving away from clashes she had with other executives and less about moving toward a great opportunity. Those rumors have never been substantiated.

The bottom line, though, is that future IPO investors can't rely on Sandberg to protect their interests as long as Zuckerberg stays in charge.

You can argue that Zuckerberg has -- in addition to riding a wave of goodwill and traffic -- also raised significant capital for the company at valuations that were very favorable to him, other founders and his employees.

More than $716 million has been raised by this company over the years -- most recently at a $10 billion valuation for the company. Yet the vast majority of the significant capital recently raised by the company (from Microsoft (MSFT Quote), Li Ka Shing and DST) was raised by Owen Van Natta and Gideon Yu -- not Zuckerberg. Both men have since left the company. Let's see how Zuckerberg does on the IPO roadshow, standing on his own two flip-flops.

Now we have the latest move, to a dual-class share structure. Google is probably the most successful company that also famously has such a structure -- which it put in place before its IPO. Google's success now provides Facebook cover on this issue.

In my view, dual-class structures are inherently wrong -- no matter which company you are. No companies succeed because of a dual-class structure that lets the founders sit in their offices and daydream out the window about the long-term possibilities for their company; any company (including Google) that succeeds with such a structure does so in spite of it.

Dual-class structures are inherently antishareholder. They are favored by family monarchs who usually run media companies or monopolistic cable companies. How's that focus on long-term value creation working out for The Washington Post (WPO Quote) and The New York Times(NYT Quote)?

Recent academic studies have shown managers at dual-class structure companies waste cash-flow and pursue goals that serve their private interests vs. those of shareholders compared to non-dual-class structures.

The fact that some very prominent venture capitalists (Greylock and Accel Partners) on this board are allowing this to go on is an embarrassment to them. Silicon Valley VCs have a practice applying laissez-faire corporate governance -- especially to perceived "rock star" entrepreneurs who can't shave yet. This hands-off approach to not "rocking the boat" with the successful founders would make even East Coast crony capitalist banker directors blush.

If Zuckerberg wants to retain supreme control of the company he started (Winklevoss brothers notwithstanding), he shouldn't take Facebook public or take public shareholders' money. Stay private. Rule your fiefdom as a private company in any manner you see fit. That's your investors' problem.

Or perhaps Zuckerberg should go to his existing investors (like Jim Breyer, Peter Thiel, David Sze and Li Ka Shing) and tell them that his shares are going to have 10 times the voting power as theirs "for corporate governance reasons." Let's see how they would react to that.

It's time for investors to start avoiding companies that take on dual-class structures. And it's time for Zuckerberg and Facebook to grow up.

Google co-founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page, as well as Yahoo! co-founders Jerry Yang and David Filo, had the good sense to step aside as leaders early on for the greater good of their companies. Zuckerberg suffers major delusions of grandeur and won't stop, even if it kills the company. Until that changes, private and public investors should steer clear.

At the time of publication, Jackson's fund held a long position in MSFT.

Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.

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Friday, November 27, 2009

Trading Tax Stiffs the Little Guy

By Eric Jackson, Senior Contributor

11/27/09 - 11:15 AM EST

Jim Cramer came out earlier this week with the view that he could live with a trading tax that imposed a 0.25% surcharge on any trade made in America. The main reason he cited for being willing to go along with the tax was that he thought it would help the government create jobs.

He said,

"If we do not create jobs in this country we will fall horribly behind all others in the world. I think we will be doomed to permanently low growth, if no growth at all. I believe that it is incumbent upon everyone to sacrifice at this time."

Cramer also said that if sacrifice is needed, people trading stocks can afford to pay such a tax.

While I support Cramer's interest in seeing job creation flourish in America, I completely disagree that the "trader tax" will accomplish this aim. To the contrary, I think allowing such a tax to take root here would accomplish just the opposite. In my view, such a tax would encourage large amounts of capital to relocate outside of America, jobs would be lost (not gained) and total government tax revenue would likely go down.

For a preview of what could happen in the U.S. if this trader tax was imposed, look at Britain. At the moment, the U.K. is in even worse fiscal shape than the United States. Because of that, its Labour government recently introduced additional taxes that specifically target hedge funds' trading profits. Government bureaucrats assumed this was an easy way of generating tax revenue. What they failed to appreciate is that capital has never been more fungible than in today's global market.

London-based hedge funds immediately announced they were relocating to Switzerland in droves, where they would face none of the new taxes levied in the U.K. With those funds go certain administrative and back-office jobs. But more important, ask London bankers how they feel about losing the many profitable revenue streams attributable to doing business with hedge funds that will now be sent to Swiss banks.

The U.K. banks also will likely lose jobs tied to serving those hedge funds. And the U.K. government, in one fell swoop, just lost a host of capital gains, personal income and payroll taxes. Congratulations. An article in a London hedge fund industry newsletter from earlier this week had the headline: "Will the last hedge fund manager leaving to leave London please turn out the lights?"

Should the U.S. impose a trader tax, we'll see a similar exodus of U.S.-based investment firms and hedge funds to locales that don't require such a tax. And, believe me, many jurisdictions will be competing for the tax revenue those firms bring with them.

But this trader tax also will weigh heavily on smaller traders, as well as the big hedge funds. It's not fair that this tax will stick it to the little guy while the big banks got to run themselves like badly managed hedge funds, taking in mom-and-pop deposits and then leveraging up those assets 32-to-1 so they could trade and then lose billions of dollars on bad bets. If these big banks had actually been hedge funds, or smaller traders trading their personal accounts, they'd be gone right now. They wouldn't have been shown any sympathy. They'd be toast. Instead, they get bailed out, made whole, lent money at zero interest indefinitely, and now they get to report record profits for the year. Their taxes aren't raised, but small-time traders have to pay for their mistakes? Come on. The fairness of that escapes me.

Can you imagine if someone like Rupert Murdoch, chairman of News Corp.(NWS Quote), had been running the Federal Reserve or acting as Treasury secretary when the financial meltdown occurred last year? When the banks came running for a bailout, Murdoch (or any business executive) overseeing the taxpayers' money would have said, "Sure, we can arrange for a loan, but I want equity and warrants, I want control over management, and before you guys pay any bonuses to yourselves for the next 10 years, you're going to pay out a special dividend to me first. If you don't like my offer, try to find another U.S. federal government to help you."

I saw a story the other day that FDIC chief Sheila Bair was urging banks to start lending to create jobs. Urging. I thought of Murdoch again. Do you think if he had control of any bank he would "urge" management to take certain actions? No, he'd tell them what he wanted. And at the moment, he'd be telling the banks to lend money instead of stockpiling cash.

Finally, as much as I want to see job creation (as Cramer does), I don't see how paying any more taxes to the government is going to directly lead to creating more jobs. Look at the track record so far. After Congress approved $800 billion in stimulus last year, only 24% of that amount has been spent to date. We have no new jobs -- just slowing job losses. The administration keeps telling us about jobs saved. I can't recall ever hearing that statistic quoted before this year. Wouldn't it be quicker and more immediate if the Fed told the banks -- which they control -- to start lending out money to small businesses again, instead of stockpiling cash and cutting their credit lines?

There is a problem looming on the horizon for the U.S. and all Western countries. Debt as a percentage of gross domestic product is on the rise, big time. The current spending trends, combined with expected lower tax revenue, cannot continue indefinitely. The time to pay the piper will come. As a society, we are going to need to sacrifice in the years ahead. This sacrifice will come through lower benefits due to lower government spending on programs, or it will come from higher taxes.

Personally, I'd rather see less government spending, which would allow taxes to stay lower to spur business investment. This will require politically unpopular decisions, however, and it's not clear that short-term-thinking politicians will have the stomach for that.

If higher taxes are needed, we should all pay up -- not just traders. But the banks who got us in this mess -- and who are still on the government dole while paying themselves record bonuses -- should pay more.

At the time of publication, Jackson had no positions in any stocks mentioned.

Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.

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Wednesday, November 25, 2009

Paulson is About Performance

Stock quotes in this article: BAC , C , SHLD

There were two reactions I got to my column last week on Greg Zuckerman's new book The Greatest Trade Ever about John Paulson's $20 billion bearish housing trade in 2007: "He was lucky" and "He won't do it again."

Even though these comments are mostly sour grapes, here's the problem with overanalyzing winners -- for the financial media, potential investors and even money managers, like Paulson himself.

Our society celebrates winners (athletes, politicians and investment managers like John Paulson) and ignores losers. From 1994-2007, in the eyes of many, Paulson was a loser. His hedge fund, Paulson & Co., had mediocre returns during this period. He was defined as a merger arbitrage guy. Because of this categorization, some investors were alarmed by his ideas about betting against the housing market using credit default swaps. Yet, he did -- and we know the results.

John Paulson
John Paulson, hedge fund manager

Although his pre-2007 performance didn't stand out, people who knew Paulson thought highly of him, according to Zuckerman. Investors were often impressed with his understated but effective way of clearly articulating his investment theses.

Post-2007, the perception of Paulson went from career underachiever to seer. He is now celebrated, and his recent stakes in Citigroup(C Quote), Bank of America (BAC Quote) and gold are seen as green lights to other investors to buy.

If Paulson told us tomorrow that Martians were going to invade us next month, there would be a run on Martian army gear.

Yet, this reaction is equally superficial in the opposite direction. We don't care why he thinks gold is a buy or why Bank of America will double in two years. This isn't Paulson's fault. He can't help it. It is the reality that's developed around him while he's gone about his business trying to make money for his investors. It's exactly the same as the heavy attention paid to Warren Buffett's moves.

This is classic "survivorship bias." There were 20,000 hedge funds in the halcyon days of 2007. No matter what the markets did over the next 18 months, five to 10 funds would have had scored 100%-plus returns and been celebrated. If Bernanke had cut interest rates drastically in 2006, maybe New Century would have continued to be a huge moneymaker by issuing subprime mortgages.

David Einhorn would be known today as having the canny intuition to get long that stock (and join its board) in 2006, instead of for calling Lehman's implosion in early 2008. Had the housing boom continued, perhaps Greg Zuckerman's book would be about former Bear Stearns hedge fund manager, Ralph Cioffi. Of course, this didn't happen and, instead, Cioffi is fighting civil charges by the SEC, and John Paulson is the hero.

Survivorship bias leads to celebrating the winners and -- usually -- overinterpreting their moves leading up to their success and trying to apply these actions to future situations. At least no one in the mainstream media has yet called John Paulson "the next Warren Buffett."

Remember Eddie Lampert? That's what Business Week and countless other magazines called him back in 2004. Although many still defend Lampert as smart, his past five years of performance have been very disappointing, and his Sears Holdings(SHLD Quote) investment specifically has been ... early.

Although it's easy to pick on the financial media for these flubs in hindsight, they are merely reflecting our own deep-seated human desires for making sense of a seemingly senseless market. They wouldn't tell us who'll be the next Warren Buffett, unless we wanted to buy their magazine (or click on their links) to find out. We gravitate to "winners" for pearls of wisdom to help us be more winnerlike.

This is why investors "performance chase." The best performing hedge funds (and mutual funds) will always attract the most capital. After all, performance is what it's all about. Most investors will overlook lots of quirks, ethical lapses and hard-to-follow musings about the state of the markets in investor letters, if the money manager performs.

The longer and better he or she performs, the more leash we give him or her (like Madoff) or the more we celebrate him (like Peter Lynch, Lampert and now Paulson). But past performance (and a fund's ability to raise capital) is no guarantee of future success.

Investors should judge money managers on their current ideas. If you'd done so when John Paulson made his argument for why to bet against housing in 2006 and 2007 -- despite the fact that he wasn't a "housing guy" -- you made a lot of money. His pro-gold and pro-financials views now should be also judged on their merits, not because "John Paulson thinks so." Of course, you and I will probably never have the chance to place money with Paulson. So this lesson becomes even more important. How are you going to know the next John Paulson when you bump into him or her?

Finally, let's turn to the critique of "Paulson will never do it again." Most people assume that smart people will, over time, outperform their peers. This is true. Yet, we also know smart people drove Enron, WorldCom and Lehman Brothers off cliffs -- all companies that, before their collapses, had been celebrated in the financial media with books written about them "getting it" while their competitors didn't. How can this happen and how can Paulson avoid this fate?

Michael Burry, a doctor-turned-hedge fund manager also profiled in Zuckerman's book, who also profited from betting against housing despite great protestations from his investors, had a memorable line: "A money manager does not go from being a near nobody to being nearly universally applauded to being nearly universally vilified without some effect."

Paulson's gone from obscurity to being perceived by many as the top hedge fund manager in the world. With that change, Paulson has received enormous wealth, but at a cost. His every trade gets discussed and debated in the media. He's likely become more isolated for security reasons, making it harder to relate to the "real world" in which his investments operate. And he likely has more "yes men" around him than ever before.

If you're on Paulson's team, you've made huge money recently. Unwittingly, you'll start agreeing with him more on his new investment ideas. Anyone who doesn't agree will probably leave on his own accord or be asked to leave. Those remaining on the team are the most loyal and the least likely to disagree with the boss' views. Active debate helps form great investment ideas. But, as money managers get more successful, they face less and less debate.

I disagree that John Paulson was lucky in betting against housing. From Zuckerman's account, Paulson did his homework, while everyone else stayed too long at the party. I also think that he can still conceive of and execute great trades. But there's no question that it will be more difficult now than before . Ask Lampert. Paulson's continued success is not his birthright.

Any investor choosing a money manager needs to remember the story of the emperor's new clothes. Managers like to dazzle investors with technical terms and fancy charts. However, they should be able to clearly and articulately explain their basic strategy. No amount of buzz or press clippings is an adequate substitute for clear-headedness. (In fact, if they seem overly concerned with their media appearances, this signals they care more about their image than managing your money.) You shouldn't worry about asking a stupid question. If they show a whiff of arrogance in responding to your questions, run away as fast as you can.

Answering these questions will help you skate to where the puck's going, not where it's been. It will also help you ensure differentiating between "flash in the pan" money managers from those with staying power. And, just maybe, you'll find the next John Paulson.

At the time of publication, Jackson fund held no positions in the stocks mentioned.

Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.

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Monday, November 23, 2009

Stock Focus: Red Robin Gourmet Burgers

By Eric Jackson
TheStreet.com Senior Contributor

11/19/2009 1:15 PM EST
Click here for more stories by Eric Jackson

One of the more surprising sectors of 2009 has been casual dining restaurants. At the start of the year amid concerns of consumer deleveraging, some analysts were expecting a prolonged battering of any stocks with consumer discretionary exposure. Yet restaurants have held up very strongly, especially snapping back from the March lows. It turns out Americans like eating out -- even when times are tough -- and I've identified a stock poised to benefit from the casual-dining trend.

The Powershares Dynamic Food & Beverage (PBJ - commentary - Trade Now) ETF is up 9% for the year, but many specialty restaurant chains have far outpaced that. PF Chang's Bistro (PFCB - commentary - Trade Now) is up 53% so far this year, and Buffalo Wild Wings (BWLD - commentary - Trade Now) is up an even more impressive 64% year to date. The well-regarded restaurant conglomerate Darden (DRI - commentary - Trade Now) is up a more modest 15% YTD (after a very strong recovery in the spring that has since tailed off).

Rather than recommend one of these names and risk chasing performance, I'm going to discuss a restaurant stock that's been tossed in the markdown bin: Red Robin Gourmet Burgers (RRGB - commentary - Trade Now).

Red Robin focuses on high-end burgers and fries, but it's still burgers, so the average check size for families is extremely low ($11.57 in the last quarter). The company has more than 430 restaurants in the U.S. and Canada. Its primary competitors are the general chains Applebee's (owned by DineEquity (DIN - commentary - Trade Now)), Chili's (owned by Brinker (EAT - commentary - Trade Now)) and TGI Friday's.

First, let's discuss the positives of a Red Robin investment. This is a valuation story: The stock is down more than 6% for the year after disappointing on its two most recent earnings calls. The stock is simply too cheap relative to its peers. Its forward P/E ratio is currently at 11 times, while other specialty chains (which Red Robin is) like Buffalo Wild Wings and PF Chang's sport forward P/Es at 17 to 20 times. Brinker and DineEquity have forward P/Es of 11.5 times, but they are both generalist chains.

Red Robin hasn't run heavy discounting to lure customers over the last six months, as Brinker and DineEquity have done, so cash flow has held up well. The company has generated $91 million in cash flow over the past 12 months, compared to $152 million for DineEquity (which also includes IHOP in those numbers) and $287 million for Brinker (which also includes several smaller chains besides Chili's), but DineEquity and Brinker are two and four times the revenue size of Red Robin, respectively. Many analysts expect Red Robin will have an easier time keeping its prices higher going forward relative to competitors who have heavily discounted.

Red Robin has also generated this cash flow growth in the face of falling traffic over the past two quarters. The company has done little marketing over this time period, a negative that has hurt sales and margins, but management will presumably correct this deficiency in the months and quarters ahead. If sales rebound, Red Robin's earnings will go up at an accelerated pace. Its competitors have continued heavy spends on marketing throughout the year, so I expect Red Robin to see a much greater return on its incremental marketing dollars spent in the next year compared to those peers.

As for the risks, Red Robin's management appears to be weak, especially the vice president of marketing. I have no clue why the company would just shut off the marketing valve over these past six months with no plans to increase this spend until new product rollouts in February. This value stock will be a falling knife until it proves to the market that dropping sales have bottomed and are rebounding. At the moment, you're taking a bit of a leap of faith, and that's dangerous. I would be more comfortable with some clear marketing direction from the company. At the moment, that's this company's biggest hole, and CEO Dennis Mullen owns that weakness until he corrects it.

Unlike many other specialty casual dining chains, Red Robin carries debt: $200 million worth. Perhaps it's that debt that is causing them to penny-pinch on marketing. It's a manageable debt load, especially with the company's strong cash flow, but it puts even more pressure on this management team to perform.

Additionally, I also was left scratching my head following the last earnings call about managing commodity costs. Commodities are generally way down from a year ago, and just a few days prior to the Red Robin third-quarter call, Texas Roadhouse (TXRH - commentary - Trade Now) announced an earnings beat that it primarily credited to declining commodity costs. (Texas Roadhouse's stock has jumped 15% since that announcement.) Red Robin, whose commodity-use profile is very similar to that of Texas Roadhouse, announced that gross margins were flat sequentially, although it alluded to the prospect of commodity costs declining in the next couple of quarters as some contracts roll over.

The bottom line is that I expect Red Robin's management team to start aggressively marketing again relatively soon and to benefit from an uptick in resulting traffic and those expected declining commodity costs. After two recent quarterly misses, the company is certainly due for an earnings beat and a surge in the stock price. Investors might have to wait for the first-quarter call before that happens, but a long position now in an unloved stock like Red Robin will likely be rewarded over the next six to eight months.


Please note that due to factors including low market capitalization and/or insufficient public float, we consider Red Robin Gourmet Burgers and DineEquity to be small-cap stocks. You should be aware that such stocks are subject to more risk than stocks of larger companies, including greater volatility, lower liquidity and less publicly available information, and that postings such as this one can have an effect on their stock prices.

At the time of publication, Jackson's fund had no positions in the stocks mentioned. Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.

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Wednesday, November 18, 2009

The Lessons of John Paulson & The Greatest Trade Ever

By Eric Jackson, Senior Contributor 11/18/09 - 06:00 AM EST

Stock quotes in this article: C , GS

If it wasn't clear already that John Paulson had reached the zenith of his hedge fund profession, one only had to watch how fervently the media and blogosphere digested the news of Paulson & Co.'s quarterly holdings which was released last Friday.

Market commentators immediately pounced on how the one-time housing bear had loaded up on 300 million shares in Citigroup(C Quote) during the quarter, while dumping his entire holdings in Goldman Sachs(GS Quote).

Similar 13-F holdings of other hedge fund managers like David Einhorn and George Soros filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in recent days have been summarily ignored compared to the reaction to Paulson's. (Citi shares jumped 3.2% the day after Paulson's announcement, far outpacing the S&P and Financial index that day.)



As far as hedge fund managers go today, John Paulson is the man. Ken Griffin, Stevie Cohen, and Eddie Lampert and others are afterthoughts.

In Gregory Zuckerman's new book, The Greatest Trade Ever, the Wall Street Journal reporter chronicles how Paulson mounted his ascent from nobody to this industry's seer of the moment.

Seven years ago, Paulson was relatively unknown. He was a merger-arbitrage guy running $300 million dollars. The former Baker Scholar from Harvard Business School couldn't help but feel that - in his mid-40s - he had under-achieved his career potential.

A key analyst alongside Paulson was Paolo Pellegrini. A failed Lazard banker with two divorces and zero net worth at the time he joined Paulson, Pellegrini had to make this last career chance work.

He lived in a one bedroom apartment up in Westchester and would arrive at work at 6:30 am in order to get the cheapest parking lot rate nearby. No one seemed to like him at first. He was a bit of a hot-head and talked too much. Yet, eventually he helped identify the housing bubble that Paulson would turn into a $16 billion winning trade for his firm and $4 billion for Paulson.

Beyond the interesting outsider-type characters working at Paulson, Zuckerman's book offers many lessons for small and large investors. One is the risk, but potential reward, that comes from breaking away from the herd mentality that surrounds Wall Street.

Nobody on Wall Street gave these guys a chance, when they started betting against housing. In fact, Paulson was routinely laughed at. Because the banking infrastructure was making so much money off of housing in 2004 - 2006, there was no reason for so many people to imagine it would end.

Even among hedge funds -- who are paid handsomely to anticipate and invest in where the puck is going, not where it's been -- precious few made this bearish trade. At the time, wise managers saw only the obstacles to the trade working out (like the federal government bailing out sub-prime borrowers and "containing" the problem from other parts of housing) and they clung to a misplaced blind trust in "their models" which showed housing couldn't decrease in value.

Even after he makes the bet, Zuckerman points out how there are so many times that people tell Paulson to take the bet off or cash in his profits too early. His own investors complained. Complaints also came from brokers from Bear Stearns and others who helped sell him the credit default swaps on the toxic tranches of mortgage bonds, as well as the most troubled sub-prime lenders and banks holding the troubled securities.

Even his own staff complained that he wasn't taking money off the table. They told him to sell when he was down in his trade and they told him to sell when he was up on the trade after New Century reported its first blown quarter in early 2007. Through it all, Paulson stuck to his guns because he foresaw even bigger profits ahead - and he was proved right.

As a fund manager, I often ponder the challenge of balancing between (1) trusting yourself and your investment thesis completely even when no one else does and (2) being aware enough to know when you're being too stubborn and "not seeing the facts" or when the trade is going against you.

In Paulson's case, every new bit of data which came to light and possibly contradicted his investment thesis was always scrutinized by him and his team to see if they had "missed something." He always stuck with the trade because he felt confident in the depth of research they had invested in understanding the problem/investment opportunity.

For Paulson, it all boiled down to one chart which Pellegrini produced showing the inflation-adjusted growth in housing prices over time divided by wage growth. The data clearly showed a rapid explosion upward away from the general trend starting in 2000. He assumed this trend would not continue indefinitely and revert (even overshoot). He was right.

The Greatest Trade Ever isn't just about John Paulson. It describes some smaller players who also bet against housing. Their stories are also very interesting and some of the characters are really colorful and interesting. Some run into the problem of not having enough capital to implement the trade to the degree they want to. Some wait too long.

One investor, Michael Burry, got his break as a fund manager when well-known value investor Joel Greenblatt made a big investment in him. Later, after taking a big bet against housing early on, Burry faced Greenblatt's wrath. In no uncertain terms, Greenblatt told him to get out of the trade. Burry didn't but not without taking a huge mental and physical toll on himself. Put yourself in Burry's shoes. What must it have felt like to tell your maker to take a hike?

There are several lessons in The Greatest Trade Ever for investors: believe in yourself (assuming you've done your homework), be skeptical of others' free opinions and assumptions, persist, and take the long view and don't take profits too early.

Every investor involved in this bearish housing trade early on referred to it as their potential "Soros trade" - referring to the famous 1992 bet against the British pound which netted Soros' fund $1 billion.

Paulson used this line himself, but he also remembered another Soros comment that stuck in his mind as he executed his trade. When you see the perfect trade set-up in front of you, Soros advised to "go for the jugular." Paulson did and it paid off big-time. Some of us will never see a trade like that for the rest of our lives. When opportunity knocks, you have to answer.

At the time of publication, Jackson's Fund had no holdings in any of the equities mentioned.

Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.

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