Showing posts with label Hedge Funds. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hedge Funds. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 22, 2011

Investor Class Warfare Unproductive

By Eric Jackson, Senior Contributor06/22/11 - 06:00 AM EDT

NEW YORK (TheStreet) -- I attended a fantastic conference on corporate governance last week at the Millstein Center at Yale University in New Haven. The conference (like the center itself) is organized by Ira Millstein, the famed corporate lawyer from Weil Gotshal & Manges.

I'm a believer in strong corporate governance and come at it from the perspective of equity investor via my hedge fund. I've gone to bat against several boards over the years (most famouslyYahoo!(YHOO_) that I perceived of as weak and not best representing their shareholders.

One would think I would hold very different views on governance than Ira Millstein, as he and his firm are paid by corporate clients to protect their boards from "overly-aggressive" investors like me trying to push for "distracting" changes.

But in fact I found myself agreeing with almost each point Ira made during the various panels and off-line discussions at the group. He's a very practical and sensible man and he wants to see strong boards that protect their shareholders' interests, not insulate their managements from legitimate criticisms.

I was more surprised to find myself disagreeing with many of the participants at the conference who I would have thought I'd be on the same side with -- other long-term investors from pension funds, unions, institutional asset managers and even economists, think-tank types or academics who would seem to be on the side of the investor versus "fat cat" managers.

One of the more common criticisms on these investors' minds at the conference was how "short-term investors" were hurting our capital markets even more than bad CEOs or bad boards.

Marty Whitman of Third Avenue seethed on one of the panels saying: "It's offensive to even call these short-term guys "investors." I would refer to them as nothing more than "market participants."

Heads nodded. There was clapping encouragement. And the questions that followed from audience members overwhelmingly concurred.

According to most of these attendees, the average hold time of most investors in American companies today is six to eight months. The reason for that is not them (remember they are pensions, labor funds, and mutual funds). They are long-term holders. They are trustworthy. They are doing God's work. The bad guys who caused the flash crash and who force "good" managers to focus on short-term quarterly results are hedge funds (like me). Hedge funds are short-termists. Hedge funds are opportunists. Hedge funds are bad.

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[** This post is an excerpt of the full article, which is available on TheStreet.com by clicking here. Free Site.**]

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Thursday, March 24, 2011

Apple and the Wild Hedge Funds

By Eric Jackson
RealMoney Contributor

3/24/2011 12:15 PM EDT
Click here for more stories by Eric Jackson

One of the funniest semi-regular segments on Jim Cramer's "Mad Money" show is the one he calls "Hedge Funds Gone Wild." He brings it out every time there has been an indiscriminate market selloff, and he's trying to preach to the longer-horizon investor to ignore the volatile movements of certain stocks caused by these short-term hedge funds.

In our 24-7 world where we judge our CEOs on a quarter-by-quarter basis, it's not surprising that we give our money managers an even harder time. Hedge funds have to report their monthly numbers to their investors, and in recent years, many of the larger funds have to provide more regular updates than that. It's quite common to hear about funds providing weekly updates, and I've even heard of some funds providing some of their bigger investors with daily updates.

This type of scrutiny means that fund managers are even more under the gun to perform and simply cannot have even a couple of bad days. Otherwise, they risk getting a bunch of angry phone calls or, worse, redemption notices.

Therefore, many hedge-fund managers have an especially itchy trigger finger these days. If the broader macro environment hits a rough patch, due to Libyan bombings, protests in Bahrain or uncertainty in Japan, it's "sell now and ask questions later."

That said, certain stocks are among the bigger hedge funds' more popular holdings. Goldman Sachs updates a regular list of the top holdings of hedge funds. They include MasterCard (MA - commentary -Trade Now), Visa (V - commentary - Trade Now), Qualcomm (QCOM - commentary - Trade Now) and Wal-Mart (WMT - commentary - Trade Now).

But perhaps no other stock is as loved these days by hedge funds (and other investors) as Apple (AAPL -commentary - Trade Now). More and more, you hear new hedge fund managers throwing their weight behind the name. A few months ago, David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital made the case for it. Value investor Lee Cooperman owns it in his Omega Advisors fund. John Burbank of Passport Capital owns it

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[*** This post is an excerpt of the full article, available by clicking here to go to RealMoney.com. Note: subscription required. ***]

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Wednesday, January 27, 2010

Volcker Rule Would Make Banks Be Banks

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Tuesday, December 08, 2009

How Hedge Fund Compensation Envy Caused the Financial Meltdown

By Eric Jackson, Senior Contributor

12/08/09 - 12:27 PM EST

Hedge funds have received more than their fair share of criticism in the past two years. They've been called too secretive, overpaid, indulgent, bratty and -- most seriously, because of the regulatory implications -- dark pools of potentially overleveraged capital highly correlated in risk with other financial institutions.

I think all these characterizations are distorted, although there's an element of truth in them. Drive around the Hamptons in the summer and you too might roll your eyes at some of the excesses of hedge fund managers.

But when you review 2008, no hedge funds of any consequence were at the center of the meltdown (aside from Bernie Madoff, but he was simply a fraud, not a hedge fund). Some failed, but there was not one government bailout of a hedge fund.

Most regulatory concerns about hedge funds today relate to a hedge fund that has been out of business for more than a decade: Long-Term Capital Management. When it blew up in 1998, its infallible Nobel laureate managers saw their losses get multiplied 40 times because of excessive leverage. Worse, those losses were amplified because LTCM's counterparty banks had mimicked many of the fund's trades. Leverage at many hedge funds appears to be much more in check these days. Funds are also much more secretive about their trades.

[To read the rest of this post on TheStreet.com, click here]

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Friday, November 27, 2009

Trading Tax Stiffs the Little Guy

By Eric Jackson, Senior Contributor

11/27/09 - 11:15 AM EST

Jim Cramer came out earlier this week with the view that he could live with a trading tax that imposed a 0.25% surcharge on any trade made in America. The main reason he cited for being willing to go along with the tax was that he thought it would help the government create jobs.

He said,

"If we do not create jobs in this country we will fall horribly behind all others in the world. I think we will be doomed to permanently low growth, if no growth at all. I believe that it is incumbent upon everyone to sacrifice at this time."

Cramer also said that if sacrifice is needed, people trading stocks can afford to pay such a tax.

While I support Cramer's interest in seeing job creation flourish in America, I completely disagree that the "trader tax" will accomplish this aim. To the contrary, I think allowing such a tax to take root here would accomplish just the opposite. In my view, such a tax would encourage large amounts of capital to relocate outside of America, jobs would be lost (not gained) and total government tax revenue would likely go down.

For a preview of what could happen in the U.S. if this trader tax was imposed, look at Britain. At the moment, the U.K. is in even worse fiscal shape than the United States. Because of that, its Labour government recently introduced additional taxes that specifically target hedge funds' trading profits. Government bureaucrats assumed this was an easy way of generating tax revenue. What they failed to appreciate is that capital has never been more fungible than in today's global market.

London-based hedge funds immediately announced they were relocating to Switzerland in droves, where they would face none of the new taxes levied in the U.K. With those funds go certain administrative and back-office jobs. But more important, ask London bankers how they feel about losing the many profitable revenue streams attributable to doing business with hedge funds that will now be sent to Swiss banks.

The U.K. banks also will likely lose jobs tied to serving those hedge funds. And the U.K. government, in one fell swoop, just lost a host of capital gains, personal income and payroll taxes. Congratulations. An article in a London hedge fund industry newsletter from earlier this week had the headline: "Will the last hedge fund manager leaving to leave London please turn out the lights?"

Should the U.S. impose a trader tax, we'll see a similar exodus of U.S.-based investment firms and hedge funds to locales that don't require such a tax. And, believe me, many jurisdictions will be competing for the tax revenue those firms bring with them.

But this trader tax also will weigh heavily on smaller traders, as well as the big hedge funds. It's not fair that this tax will stick it to the little guy while the big banks got to run themselves like badly managed hedge funds, taking in mom-and-pop deposits and then leveraging up those assets 32-to-1 so they could trade and then lose billions of dollars on bad bets. If these big banks had actually been hedge funds, or smaller traders trading their personal accounts, they'd be gone right now. They wouldn't have been shown any sympathy. They'd be toast. Instead, they get bailed out, made whole, lent money at zero interest indefinitely, and now they get to report record profits for the year. Their taxes aren't raised, but small-time traders have to pay for their mistakes? Come on. The fairness of that escapes me.

Can you imagine if someone like Rupert Murdoch, chairman of News Corp.(NWS Quote), had been running the Federal Reserve or acting as Treasury secretary when the financial meltdown occurred last year? When the banks came running for a bailout, Murdoch (or any business executive) overseeing the taxpayers' money would have said, "Sure, we can arrange for a loan, but I want equity and warrants, I want control over management, and before you guys pay any bonuses to yourselves for the next 10 years, you're going to pay out a special dividend to me first. If you don't like my offer, try to find another U.S. federal government to help you."

I saw a story the other day that FDIC chief Sheila Bair was urging banks to start lending to create jobs. Urging. I thought of Murdoch again. Do you think if he had control of any bank he would "urge" management to take certain actions? No, he'd tell them what he wanted. And at the moment, he'd be telling the banks to lend money instead of stockpiling cash.

Finally, as much as I want to see job creation (as Cramer does), I don't see how paying any more taxes to the government is going to directly lead to creating more jobs. Look at the track record so far. After Congress approved $800 billion in stimulus last year, only 24% of that amount has been spent to date. We have no new jobs -- just slowing job losses. The administration keeps telling us about jobs saved. I can't recall ever hearing that statistic quoted before this year. Wouldn't it be quicker and more immediate if the Fed told the banks -- which they control -- to start lending out money to small businesses again, instead of stockpiling cash and cutting their credit lines?

There is a problem looming on the horizon for the U.S. and all Western countries. Debt as a percentage of gross domestic product is on the rise, big time. The current spending trends, combined with expected lower tax revenue, cannot continue indefinitely. The time to pay the piper will come. As a society, we are going to need to sacrifice in the years ahead. This sacrifice will come through lower benefits due to lower government spending on programs, or it will come from higher taxes.

Personally, I'd rather see less government spending, which would allow taxes to stay lower to spur business investment. This will require politically unpopular decisions, however, and it's not clear that short-term-thinking politicians will have the stomach for that.

If higher taxes are needed, we should all pay up -- not just traders. But the banks who got us in this mess -- and who are still on the government dole while paying themselves record bonuses -- should pay more.

At the time of publication, Jackson had no positions in any stocks mentioned.

Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.

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Wednesday, November 04, 2009

What Galleon Teaches Us

By Eric Jackson
11/04/09 - 06:00 AM EST

Stock quotes in this article: AMD , INTC , IBM

The government's case against Raj Rajaratnam, founder of hedge fund Galleon Group, on the charge of insider trading alleges that the hedge fund manager's primary competitive advantage for investors was a web of connections close to or inside technology companies feeding him illegal tips on future directions of the companies' stock prices.

What's shocking is how Rajaratnam is accused of having, over at least 10 years, cultivated a network of insiders feeding him nonpublic information about future earnings announcements from public companies like AMD(AMD Quote) (including its former CEO), IBM (IBM Quote) Intel(INTC Quote) and some of their most prestigious advisers like McKinsey & Co.

Why would so many bright, high-ranking people at such successful companies get caught up in such activities? Perhaps they craved access to a man whom Forbes recently ranked as the 262nd richest American, worth $1.8 billion and in the top 40 of hedge fund managers.

In a recent PBS "Frontline" episode on Alan Greenspan, the program made the allegation that the former Federal Reserve chief and acolyte of free marketer Ayn Rand had once joked with former head of the CFTC, Brooksley Born, that the two of them would never get along because she believed in prosecuting capital markets crimes and he didn't. He supposedly went on to explain that his strong faith in free markets made him believe that it was unnecessary to go after white-collar criminals through any kind of enforcement program.

Instead, Greenspan believed that market participants would ferret out ill-gotten gains and punish those people for their crimes by starving them of future capital. Such efficiencies would likely occur before the governmental regulatory body even knew something nefarious was going on.

Although I'm a proponent of unencumbered free markets, this point of view, whether Greenspan held it or not, is laughable. Bernie Madoff has blown this argument out of the water. And now we have the case of Rajaratnam, his decade old hedge fund, and his alleged 10 years of generating alpha through profiting on illegal insider information.

As a hedge fund manager, I look positively on this development. If illegal activity is going on by fund managers, it deserves to be highlighted and prosecuted. Investors will learn to ask tougher questions as part of their due diligence, and capital will ultimately flow away from managers posting false performance numbers to those who are truly generating alpha.

The hedge fund industry has to be one of the most Darwinian industries of any in the world. You don't get to keep your job by being the boss' son or being friendly with the right managers above you. You get to keep your job (and paid well if you do it consistently) by beating the market. You lose your job otherwise.

Perhaps because of the big potential rewards for success, it shouldn't be surprising that some aspiring and existing managers would try to bend the rules to get or stay on top. What this case shows is that ethical managers and investors are better off with a strong enforcement office at the SEC. The industry itself is not going to highlight the next cheater and investors -- even very sophisticated ones -- cannot do this themselves.

I know many hedge fund managers who've expressed mixed feelings about the Galleon case. They're happy that illegal activities by their competitors are being halted, but they worry the case will inspire more unnecessary red tape and heavy-handed oversight. The SEC is faced with a challenge in keeping ahead of the latest and greatest tricks employed by some managers to gain a performance edge.

However, the agency appears to have been pretty creative in coming up with some ways of identifying and tracking alleged illegal behavior in the Galleon case. Hopefully, it will begin to hire more people in the enforcement division with real-world Wall Street experience and not just more bureaucratic lawyers, as was criticized by Harry Markopolos in the Madoff case.

There's been a lot of discussion of getting hedge funds to register with the SEC as an important way for the agency to keep tabs on the potential risk these funds pose to the financial system. It's important, therefore, to realize that Galleon was registered -- its assets under management at one point last year topped $3 billion. More budget resources targeted towards enforcement would be taxpayer money better spent than registration for registration's sake.

Finally, a word of caution on the Galleon case. Although criminality ought to always be prosecuted to the fullest extent, Galleon and Rajaratnam deserve the right to defend themselves in court. What if they are innocent, after having announced they would be winding down the firm two business days after news of the arrests first broke? Could they ever truly be made whole by the SEC if that happened? That Orwellian possibility should send shivers down the spines of hedge fund managers everywhere.

Mark Cuban has never run a hedge fund, but what if he had when the SEC came after him last year for purportedly trading on insider information in the small-cap stock Mamma.com? If he'd had a hedge fund at the time, it likely would have also had to be wound down when details of his arrest first emerged. The SEC later dropped the charges, although it recently made some noise about bringing them back.

Wrong-doing deserves to be regulated and prosecuted by the SEC. The government should devote more resources to enforcement with the best qualified people involved. A few correct convictions will have a ripple effect throughout the hedge fund industry and discourage illicit behavior.

However, the SEC needs to realize it is playing with people's lives and livelihoods here. Investors will -- understandably -- redeem first and ask questions later when the agency launches actions against a fund or fund manager. They have a responsibility to do their jobs to the best of their abilities, as do hedge fund managers and senior executives within public companies.

Jackson's fund holds no positions in the stocks mentioned.

Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.

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Thursday, May 07, 2009

Hedge Funds: Not as Weak as Media Portrays

For the last few months, the media has portrayed the hedge fund industry as in desperate need to hang on to as much capital as possible. Hedge fund limited partners have purportedly been lining up demanding breaks on fees and access to capital in the future -- and getting them. The truth is a little different (or at least a little more nuanced) than this perception.

Based on conversations I've had with managers in the industry, there are two factors which appear to differentiate between those hedge funds who have agreed to big concessions on fees and liquidity with their investors and ones who haven't.

The first factor at play is the perceived "quality" of the hedge fund or the manager running it. There appears to be a tiered system for how funds are perceived by investors (Tier A, B, C, D, etc.). I'm not going to say which hedge fund falls into which tier, but Tier A hedge funds have much more negotiating power in discussing terms than Tier C or D.

I know of one Tier A who was instructed recently by a very large and well-known investor to cut their fees and loosen their redemption terms. The fund politely declined. The investor not only kept their money in (at the old terms) but greatly increased their allocation.

On the other hand, Tier C hedge funds are agreeing readily to the demands of their investors.

The second factor at play is what kind of portfolio a hedge fund has. There's a big differnce between funds that have only public equities (especially in large liquid companies) in their portfolios and funds that invest in the illiquid positions valued on a mark-to-model, instead of mark-to-market, basis. DB Zwirn was a former high-flying fund that traded in the former type of positions. It recently sold itself to Fortress as it needed to be able to hold on to its portfolio position for a long time to see any kind of reasonable return. It simply couldn't sell these positions to meet redemption requests.

What's most interesting about these happenings is that, despite the market ravages of 2008, the best managers at the best hedge funds, when push comes to shove, are still in demand by investors. They are not having to cut their fees or loosen their liquidity terms, even when their own 2008 performance was poor. At the end of the day, investors have to place their money somewhere and these managers still have an advantage.

Position: None.

Originally published in RealMoney.com on 5/4/2009 4:32 PM EDT

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Friday, March 06, 2009

Hedge Funds: The Road Back

From TheStreet.com

By Eric Jackson

03/06/09 - 11:05 AM EST

Last November, fund-of-hedge-funds manager Sandra Manzke of Maxam Capital Management sent out a Jerry Maguire-esque letter to her investors in which she stated that she was "appalled and disgusted" by the behavior of hedge fund managers today.

They no longer acted with investors' interests in mind, she said, as they did 25 years ago when she founded Tremont Capital. Managers today followed questionable practices like "gating, side pocketing, suspension of redemptions ... attempting to get their money out ahead of investors, [and] eliminate[ing] high water marks".

At first, Manzke was portrayed as a whistle-blower trying to get the rest of her greedy industry in line. Then, Bernie Madoff happened. In the fallout, it came to light that both Tremont and Maxam were heavy Madoff investors. Earlier this month, both firms separately announced they would have to shut down as a result of Madoff-related losses. Ironically, the firms (like many Madoff investors) did little to no meaningful due diligence and were content to play middlemen for a performing product and collect their fees. The would-be reformer should have started her efforts in her own backyard.

Hedge funds are much maligned in the press and by politicians these days. They do have some failings which need correcting, which I plainly see as a hedge fund manager myself. However, the industry will continue to attract talent, innovative strategy, and capital as a result in the coming years. Here are some of the problems with hedge funds but reasons why the industry is still an attractive place for your money.

Gating While Charging Fees is Unacceptable

A number of funds -- large and small, including ones with formerly sterling reputations such as Citadel, Farallon, and DE Shaw -- have exercised their rights to enforce a gate in the last few months, reducing how quickly investors can redeem out of the fund. The intent of a gate is to prevent a panicked run on the fund, requiring forced selling, which can be very difficult for funds holding illiquid assets, and which further lowers the value of the remaining investors' assets in the fund.

John Paulson, whose fund was up 38% in 2008, has criticized fellow managers for invoking gates, and Leon Cooperman, who runs Omega Advisers, told The New York Times "you'd have to lower me into the ground before I'd put up a gate."

In my view, erecting gates is not ideal but defensible for a manager, since the possibility is fully disclosed to investors up front. However, it's deplorable that so many hedge fund managers have recently put up gates and then continued to charge fees after doing so. That certainly hasn't engendered goodwill with investors.

Among the funds still charging full or partial management and performance fees after erecting a gate, according to several industry participants I've spoken with: Citadel, Cerberus, and Highbridge Capital Management. One fellow manager expressed deep frustration at this practice of charging fees post-gate: "It's almost criminal. It gives all of us in the industry a bad name." Some funds are doing the right thing: Farallon is not charging fees to its investors kept in by their decision to use a gate last fall.

And, of course, just as no one is paying attention to the consumers who never got themselves into a loan they couldn't afford, let's not forget the many funds that had down years in 2008 and yet imposed no gates. They've given up fees on capital that left but could have been forced to stay. Some of the funds taking the high road are Atticus, Clarium, Harbinger, Maverick, and Tremblant. These funds faced the same "unprecedented" or "Perfect Storm" market conditions and yet were still able to maintain adequate liquidity and confidence in the marks on their positions in order to pay out requested capital to their investors. These funds are taking the long-view on this issue and will benefit in future fund-raising when this current down cycle turns.

Pay for Performance Works

Hedge fund critics are quick to jump on the issue of manager compensation. Critics say hedge fund managers should always make money, no matter the market or the strategy being followed. But not every hedge fund manager is following an absolute return strategy. One of the great things about hedge funds is that there is such a diverse choice of strategies and exposure levels.

Sadly, some hedge fund managers don't help themselves in the court of public opinion -- call it John Thain-itis. Most profiles of hedge fund managers include references to private jets, homes in the Hamptons, and flashy lifestyles. Discussions about managers giving to the Robin Hood Foundation are less common. A fund-of-hedge-fund manager recently told The Wall Street Journal: "I was definitely overpaid in the good times and now I'm definitely being underpaid in the bad times."

Those comments don't put anyone in the industry in a good light (especially that manager) but, at the end of the day, these comments or whether some manager buys a flashy car, has no predictive value on whether a hedge fund is a good investment. The truth is that hedge fund managers basically will only survive as a firm if they perform. If not, they'll be out of business (as many will in the next six months) and going into a different industry.

Most investors I know don't mind paying fees, as long as they get acceptable performance. When they don't, they redeem -- as they are in spades at the moment in the industry.

Don't Tinker With High-Water Marks

Hedge funds typically have high-water marks, which require managers to make their investors whole before resuming paying themselves performance fees. These high-water marks are going to cast a large shadow in the industry for the next few years. Ken Griffin of Citadel, which dropped 55% in 2008, said recently that he and others at his shop would only be working for "psychic income" for the next few years, as they crawl out of their negative performance hole.

Some critics have said that high-water marks are not the panacea they seem. If you have a down year, these critics say, you can just shut down your fund to avoid the pain of making back past losses and open another shop up across the street. Although this can and does happen, it's equally common for hedge funds to honor their high water marks instead of taking the "easy" way out and shutting down, eliminating the high water mark, and re-opening later.

There are examples of shirking performance responsibility in smaller hedge funds. In early 2008, before the real stock market pain hit, Dan Zwirn was forced to shut his hedge fund DB Zwirn & Co. when it came to light that he had improperly paid for a jet with investors' money (amongst other back-office issues). His performance had been steady and successful prior to those revelations. Zwirn claimed the improprieties were the fault of poor back-office oversight by his CFO and wasn't linked at all to the strategy he had overseen successfully.

Because his strategy involved stakes in many illiquid assets, it will take time to fully wind down DB Zwirn. However, only a few months after the decision to shut down, rumors began to circulate that Zwirn would be launching ZLC Global -- a new fund following exactly the same strategy as DB Zwirn & Co. Many DB Zwirn & Co. investors were going to be investing in ZLC Global, according to reports. It is puzzling that some investors can be so forgiving, but this behavior is isolated and does not undermine the value investors' gain from high water marks.

Some hedge fund managers have tried to bend the rules in their favor to collect more in fees. For example, Steve Mandel of Lone Pine Capital abides by a high-water mark but can get some portion of a performance fee the next year, if he surpasses a hurdle. In other words, you don't always have to live off psychic income if you had a bad previous year.

Another bad practice that should be changed is when hedge funds insist on long lock-up periods -- say three years -- during which they still pay themselves management and performance fees annually. They don't typically claw-back their year one performance fees if they have a major performance drop in year three.

Investors will rightly have less tolerance for these "innovations" going forward. If managers screw up, they need to pay the consequences. It's that Darwinism which makes the industry strong and should give no investor qualms about having to pay performance -- or more correctly stated, revenue-sharing -- fees.

Conclusion

The hedge fund industry will work out its excesses carried over from the last five years and become a stronger collective of funds and fund managers. Most of the lemmings will leave, until the industry once again begins to experience excessive growth. Oversight must and will improve. Lessons should be learned. But in one, five, and 10 years from now -- no matter the macro environment -- investors will still flock to hedge funds because it attracts the best managers with the most creative strategies.

Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.

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Thursday, March 05, 2009

The Good, Bad, and Ugly in Hedge Funds: A Manager's View

From BusinessWeek

By Eric Jackson

March 5, 2009, 12:01AM EST

BusinessWeek reader and hedge fund manager Eric Jackson considers the pros and cons of his industry

Not too long ago, practically every newly minted MBA wanted to be a hedge fund manager, and investors—including many conservative pension funds and endowments—rushed at the chance to place assets in hedge funds. Yet hedge fund managers were blamed for both artificially inflating the price of oil last summer and, when prices dropped, for contributing to the looming recession.

The mainstream press has now taken to derisively calling them "former masters of the universe," while noting that compensation is still "obscene." As quickly as assets came in during the up market, they have gone out in a declining market. In the last quarter of 2008, $152 billion in hedge fund assets were redeemed, even ones with positive returns in 2008.

As a hedge fund manager, I'm neither an apologist nor a cheerleader for my industry. Like any business, the hedge fund world has good and bad practices and managers. All managers need to accept accountability for the trying times we are living through. But it's fanciful to suggest hedge funds are about to disappear. Quite the opposite: The industry will be thriving even five years from now because it will continue to attract the best managers and the most sophisticated investors seeking alpha through innovative strategies. Here are some of the good and bad practices in the industry today:

Barbarians at the Gates

Hedge funds have long had "gates" as options available to the fund and/or manager included in their subscription documents. All investors reviewed these prior to making an investment. You haven't heard much about them because hedge funds haven't gone through a sustained down period the way we have in the past six months. As a result, a number of funds have exercised their rights to enforce a gate, reducing how quickly investors can redeem out of the fund. The intent of a gate is to prevent a panicked run on the fund, requiring forced selling, which can be very difficult for funds holding illiquid assets, and which further lowers the value of the remaining investors' assets in the fund.

Gates are a perfectly legitimate operating mechanism and will continue to be part of hedge fund investing. Moreover, as so many funds have decided to use them in the past four months, it is unlikely any one fund will be unfairly penalized by investors when they raise new funds down the road. The managers who will be penalized for putting up a gate are the ones who continue to charge fees after doing so. That's their right under their agreements, but it certainly doesn't engender goodwill, and investors tend to have elephant-like memories.

Overpaid and Underperforming?

Critics have attacked the standard hedge fund compensation model of 2% annual management fee and 20%-of-profits performance fee in light of the industry's poor 2008 performance (-19.2% for the average fund, according to Hennessee Group). Yes, many hedge fund managers made bad calls in 2008, but one-third of hedge funds made money in a year when the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index was down 40%. Only 1 in 1,700 mutual funds made money in the same period, meaning you were 50 times more likely to make money in a hedge fund compared to a mutual fund last year. What is that worth in fees?

Sadly, some hedge fund managers don't help themselves in the court of public opinion. Call it John Thain-itis. Many media profiles of hedge fund managers mention private jets, homes in the Hamptons, and flashy lifestyles, none of which has any predictive value about whether a hedge fund is a good investment. It's always been about the returns over a specific period of time, and the comparable risk-reward of other alternatives to invest their money.

Eyeing High-Water Marks

Hedge funds typically have high-water marks, which require hedge fund managers to make their investors whole before paying themselves performance fees. These high-water marks are going to cast a large shadow in the industry for the next few years.

What high-water marks also do—from an investor's perspective—is level the differences between a hedge fund and a mutual fund or other asset manager. Any investor has to pay a percentage of assets in management fees to a money manager. In the case of hedge funds, an investor pays performance fees only when the manager makes money. Investors also know that hedge funds will invariably attract more talent because the compensation levels are higher than the mutual fund industry or elsewhere.

Some observers feel that high-water marks are not the panacea they seem. In a down year, they argue, you can just shut down your fund to avoid the pain of making back past losses and open up another shop across the street. Although this can and does happen, it's just as common for hedge funds to honor their high-water marks instead of taking the easy way out and shutting down, eliminating the high-water mark, and reopening later.

Bottom line: If managers screw up, they need to face the consequences. It's that kind of Darwinism which makes the industry strong. Investors shouldn't have any qualms about having to pay performance—or more correctly stated, revenue-sharing—fees.

Reconciling Differences

With over 10,000 hedge funds worldwide in 2008, funds naturally vary in size and strategy. Some pursue absolute returns, always seeking to grow capital, no matter the market; others aim to beat the S&P or other benchmark on a relative basis. Absolute and relative performance strategies have different levels of volatility due to the different types of risk they take on.

James Simons of Renaissance Technologies recently announced that his firm would not charge fees to existing investors for its Institutional Futures fund, which was down 12% in 2008, but would still charge fees on its Institutional Equities fund, which was down 16%. The difference between the two funds? The first follows an absolute return strategy, while the second aims to beat the S&P 500 by 4% to 6%, which it did.

There is no question that there's a sea change taking place in the hedge fund industry, which saw its assets decline by $782 billion, to $1.21 trillion, in the past year. That's a Detroit-like drop in demand on a year-over-year basis. Within five years, it's likely the mega-funds will dominate, similar to the private equity world, where you have KKR, Bain, T.H. Lee, and a lot of small fry.

Man Group in Britain will be the model for the biggest U.S. hedge funds, running multiple strategies and catering to the institutional investor and pension fund community. It's likely the funds with more than $5 billion in assets today will assume the mega-fund mantle in the future. Funds under that level will shrink or sell out. However, niche hedge funds will continue to thrive, as long as they have unique strategies that are successful.

Most will prosper with a couple hundred million dollars in assets, although some niche strategies can handle up to $2 billion. This is where a lot of innovation and outperformance in the industry will emerge. For example, the most feted hedge fund manager of the past two years is John Paulson, who made billions betting on credit default swaps, which predicted the severe souring of the housing market.

Prior to 2007, Paulson's firm was best known for its unremarkable, yet steady positive returns and merger arbitrage expertise. It's likely that he couldn't have made his bearish housing bet at a bigger shop. The perceived risk he was taking on with the CDS, especially going against the conventional wisdom at the time that housing would rise steadily because it always had in the post-World War II era, would have been rejected. Investors will be always on the lookout for the next great manager whose wave they can ride—and it will come from the smaller, more entrepreneurial managers.

Nothing Personal

Here's a scary thought for hedge fund investors: Hedge funds domiciled offshore (e.g., in the Caymans or British Virgin Islands) have boards of directors that tend, in my experience, to be far more lax and chummy than most corporate boards. (U.S.-based funds typically do not have boards as they operate as general partnerships.) These offshore boards tend to be small, typically two or three people, one of whom is often the hedge fund principal. Since the board oversees the investment manager's mandate, this is a huge conflict of interest that most hedge fund investors don't talk about.

Although it would be wrong to have a large bureaucratic board for a relatively small and entrepreneurial organization like a hedge fund, small boards often encourage managers to ask "friends" to fulfill this role. As a result, board meetings tend to be informal, tough questions don't get asked, and a real debate of legitimate risks facing the fund is avoided.

Many funds end up appointing a "rent-a-director" who lives locally and usually is recommended by, and affiliated with, the offshore lawyer working for the fund. These professional board members often have no job except serving on dozens of similar fund boards. They are simply there to be paid, so they clock in and clock out of meetings with a 9-to-5 mentality that would make a Dilbert character blush.

There are excellent hedge fund directors. However, perhaps not as many funds would be imploding this year had their boards done a better job at holding managers' feet to the fire when times were good.

Slimming Down

The hedge fund industry will be working off its "too big, too fast" growth in the coming years. We're going from 10,000 hedge funds to perhaps 6,000 in the next few months. Performance, operational, and increased regulatory issues will weed out one-third of all hedge funds within two years. Remaining fund managers will have fewer staff, less leverage, and less compensation.

Those hedge fund managers with creative and differentiated strategies (and a track record and a background check that pass due diligence muster) will always find investors. Anyone worth their salt will stick it out; the dead weight and hangers-on will leave. That will make for a better overall industry.

Amid this upheaval and in the wake of the recent Bernard L. Madoff scandal, two hedge fund-related service providers will flourish: (1) third-party administrators who independently calculate a fund's month-end net asset values (NAV) for investors, and (2) third-party due diligence consultants who will scour the backgrounds and documents of fund managers looking for red flags to warn potential investors. I am amazed that these are still not considered absolutely required by investors before making an investment.

Who will wilt: the big fund-of-hedge-funds. Investors want managers who create value. Middlemen who take margin out of the value chain will be forced to defend their existence. Maxxam, Tremont, and Fairfield Greenwich showed us through Madoff that too few funds-of-hedge-funds do meaningful due diligence on their investments that they promised their partners. Funds-of-funds won't die but will drop away in large numbers. Only those that are truly differentiated will survive.

Investors will (and should) place more conditions on fund managers and demand more transparency. Although it will be much easier to do this in a post-Madoff world, an investor's size relative to other investors in a fund will still determine his power to demand this transparency.

Registration Debate

Politicians on both sides of the aisle have called for more oversight on hedge funds, including a suggestion for mandatory "registration." What would registration really accomplish? Many hedge funds will continue to reside outside the U.S. and not need to register. But the largest hedge funds—with a majority of assets—in the U.S. already have registered and file their 13-F list of holdings on a quarterly basis. Registration for registration's sake, giving the government an abundant amount of data to do nothing with, seems a waste of time. Madoff, by the way, was registered with the Securities & Exchange Commission.

If the government wants to help improve capital markets, they should be prosecuting scammers and Ponzi schemes like Madoff, preventing "naked" short-selling abuses, and making it easier for shareholders to oust lazy and nonperforming members of corporate boards.

The hedge fund industry will work out its excesses carried over from the past five years and become a stronger collective of funds and fund managers. Most of the lemmings will leave, until the industry once again begins to experience excessive growth. Oversight must and will improve. Lessons will be learned. And investors will continue to flock to hedge funds because the industry will continue to attract the best managers with the smartest strategies.

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Wednesday, December 31, 2008

CNBC: The Bull Case for Hedge Funds

The bull case for hedge funds, with Eric Jackson, of Ironfire Capital, and Paul Kedrosky, of Ten Asset Management

Last Update: Wed. Dec. 31 2008 11:35 AM












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Saturday, December 27, 2008

The Bullish Case for Hedge Funds

From TheStreet.com

By Eric Jackson

12/26/08 - 12:56 PM EST

The one group of investors that's been vilified more than any other by the business press and government officials alike in 2008? Hedge fund managers.

After years of rapid growth in terms of both assets and numbers of funds in operation, the hedge fund industry has taken a PR black eye this year. Media reports would have you believe that the industry is about to collapse in size, see its revenue drop dramatically through fee reductions and become heavily regulated to protect unsuspecting investors from another Bernie Madoff scam.

Hedge funds certainly make an easy target. They've had a bad year, along with every other retail and institutional investor. But the industry is about to grow dramatically over the next five years. This coming year will mark the beginning of the next wave of this industry's growth.

The 12 months of 2008 have proved an abysmal year, and every investor can't wait to be done with it. While hedge fund managers have done terribly, (with the exception of maybe Bill Miller) no one in the media seems to criticize the mutual fund managers or other wealth advisors for lousy performance.

It seems to be an unstated opinion in many articles that hedge fund managers should know better than other investors. One simple reason for this, a reason that draws endless attention and criticism, is hedge fund manager compensation. It's true that the best-performing fund managers over the last few years have been well compensated.

I don't have a problem if a hedge fund manager, the CEO of Yahoo! (YHOO Quote - Cramer on YHOO - Stock Picks) or the head of risk management at Citigroup (C Quote - Cramer on C - Stock Picks) gets paid boatloads of compensation year in and year out, on two conditions: (1) they should only be paid well based on their direct contribution to the performance of their firms, and (2) that performance should be "real" performance, meaning that there is real value created, not some illusory accounting profit.

Hedge fund managers have an advantage over those who hold the types of positions mentioned above. First, as with a sales rep, you always know how a hedge fund manager is doing. With the exception of managers that dabble in private equity or illiquid assets, which are more difficult to manage on a daily mark-to-market basis, any hedge fund investor could get a daily report on how a manager is performing.

And hedge funds -- even the big ones -- are still small shops. If a fund has a good year or a bad year, its manager, whether it's Stevie Cohen or Bill Ackman, gets the credit or the blame. They don't get to punt responsibility to a foreign office or a snowstorm that kept away retail shoppers.

The second advantage hedge fund managers have over others when it comes to their compensation is that their performance is "real" at the end of each calendar year. Simply put, the market value of your portfolio this year gets measured against last year's market value.
Whether or not these profits were aided by leverage, hedge fund managers must perform in order to be compensated. While others can use their political skills to keep their jobs, hedge fund managers have to live with their fund's performance and the consequences that performance brings.

After a disastrous 2008, the big commercial banks are holding back recently injected capital from taxpayers to pay out year-end bonuses. However, few hedge funds (with the exception perhaps of the 10% that made money this year) will pay out bonuses.

What's more, many of the hedge funds that lost money for their investors this year adhere to "high-water marks." This means they have to make back their 2008 losses in 2009 before they are eligible for future bonuses. Investors get made whole and their managers only get bonuses when they actually deserve them. Citigroup investors sure wish they could get that kind of arrangement.

Hedge fund managers -- unlike mutual fund or other private wealth managers -- get paid for performance, not assets. Their incentives are perfectly aligned with their investors. They make calculated bets and expect to be highly compensated only when they succeed. This arrangement has attracted and will continue to attract talent. The best managers will migrate to hedge funds because they can be more successful financially.

They also accept the financial and reputational pain of performing poorly. Even with less leverage and more regulation, the hedge fund industry is still the best game in town for the most talented managers.

And it's also the best game in town for investors -- which is why the industry is set to begin its next wave of growth in the next five years. The most sophisticated investors still need help managing their money. They are not going to hoard Treasury bills forever.

Do you want to invest in a mutual fund manager incentivized to grow assets but not necessarily performance? Would you not, if you had the opportunity, want to invest in the best qualified money manager?

It's true that Bernie Madoff's Ponzi scheme has shaken the trust of investors in all money managers, and that will have a fallout effect on hedge fund managers. However, the hedge fund industry will be much bigger in 2013 than 2008.

Here are some other fearless predictions for the industry:

  • The number of hedge funds will decrease by 30% between the start of 2008 and the start of 2010, but the assets under management will actually increase as investors seek out the best managers.
  • This growth will come at the expense of the mutual fund industry and wealth management.
  • The due diligence industry, which researches hedge funds and their managers, will quadruple in size. Today, there are few firms with expertise in this area (Due Diligence Consulting, Kroll and Backtracks are on a short-list of firms with expertise in this area). Investors will need to invest in hedge funds, but won't be able to rely on the Securities and Exchange Commission to conduct their due diligence. They won't mind paying for this work themselves.
  • The "2 and 20" fee structure for the industry (under which hedge funds charge 2% annually for management fees and 20% for the share of the profits created) will persist. Investors will not object as long as they receive the performance they expect.
  • Fund-of-hedge-funds will be most negatively affected by 2008. Larger institutional investors will become much more hesitant to invest in fund-of-hedge-funds over the next two years in the wake of the Madoff scandal for fear of criticism from their own investors. These types of funds will not go away, but there will only be so many people that can say, "I can get you into John Paulson's fund."
  • There will be more hedge fund regulation from Washington but not to the extent that it kills the industry. What purpose would that serve the Obama administration? A greater administrative burden dealing with new regulation will become the new cost of doing business for hedge funds. It will make it harder for newer/smaller hedge funds.
  • Hedge fund managers will become better risk managers and learn to perform without the benefit of leverage. Those with enduring strategies that can create value will grow.

Hedge funds are not going away. They're actually going to greatly increase in size over the next five years. The level of dissatisfaction in mutual fund managers and private wealth managers will cause investors to seek out better-performing investment vehicles for their cash. Although there will certainly be changes to the industry as a result of the events of 2008 -- including hedge fund failures in the next six months -- the future looks very bright for hedge fund managers and their investors because their interests are so well-aligned.














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Monday, November 13, 2006

Yahoo is In Play



The word is out that the hedge funds are circling Yahoo and Terry Semel. Valleywag is reporting that several prominent hedge funds are smelling blood in the water. Fred Wilson and Eric Savitz picked up on this a couple of weeks ago too.

There are many reasons for this, including several suggestions we made a few weeks ago here about steps Semel needed to take immediately to turn the tide operationally and with the hearts and minds of Wall Street. We repeated many of these same comments today in this radio broadcast.

What's worse, Valleywag is now suggesting that Semel recently presented Yahoo's strategy to the Yahoos and was booed. Even Henry Blodget is saying it's time for Semel to go.

Whether he was or not, Yahoo is attractive for many strategic (read: GOOG, MSFT, Fox, Viacom, Comcast -- even Disney... and don't forget eBay), as well as financial (read: hedge funds), buyers. Great underlying assets + one of the best known brands in the world + well-meaning but ineffective management = great opportunity at $27.40.

Look for something to happen, potentially sooner rather than later.

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