Showing posts with label IBM. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IBM. Show all posts

Monday, May 09, 2011

Most Useless Stat of the Day: Apple is the Most Valuable Brand in the World

Every day, the business media reports meaningless "studies" that have interesting conclusions. Today, there's a silly one out on Apple being the "most valuable brands in the world."

Read the full Forbes post here.

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Thursday, September 23, 2010

Another Micro, Soft Dividend Increase

By Eric Jackson
RealMoney Contributor

9/23/2010 1:30 PM EDT
Click here for more stories by Eric Jackson

Microsoft (MSFT - commentary - Trade Now) investors got very excited last week after the company leaked the news Bloomberg that it was going to raise additional debt in order to fund an increased dividend. In the two days after the story ran, Microsoft's shares jumped 6%.

The hope of many investors, including me, was that Microsoft was going to announce an enormous increase to its quarterly dividend, which would then cause non-investors to sit up and take notice of just how cheap "Mr. Softee" has become -- despite the fact that it is printing cash at a rate that would make the Fed blush.

I had been hoping that Microsoft would double its dividend, and, indeed, that's what I've been pushing for the company to do since this past summer when I filed a shareholder resolution on the subject. Shareholders will have the opportunity to vote on that resolution at the company's annual meeting this November.

But instead of a double-down, we found out after Tuesday's close that Microsoft would increase its regular dividend by only 23%. The company also announced that it would raise $6 billion in debt and do an unspecified amount of stock buybacks in the future.

It wasn't what the market wanted to hear and the stock has fallen 3% since Tuesday's close. The dividend increase was better than a stick in the eye for investors, but it was about as exciting as kissing your sister.

The decision shows Microsoft's inherent conservatism. The company took its time getting comfortable with doing a dividend in the first place. Then, it took even longer for the company to accept the idea of raising debt by using its bullet-proof, triple-A balance sheet. When Microsoft increased its dividend in the past, it's generally been a 10% bump. The company probably believes a 23% increase is akin to living on the edge. Hardly.

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[*** This post is an excerpt of the full article, available by clicking here to go to RealMoney.com. Note: subscription required. ***]

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Wednesday, September 01, 2010

Too Much Cash on Hand

By Eric Jackson
RealMoney Contributor

8/31/2010 7:45 AM EDT
Click here for more stories by Eric Jackson


I've been asked by several people over the past week what I think of the battle going on for 3Par (PAR -commentary - Trade Now) between Dell (DELL - commentary - Trade Now) and Hewlett-Packard (HPQ -commentary - Trade Now). I'm convinced that it's a great thing for 3Par shareholders and equally convinced it will be a bust for the shareholders of the company that wins 3Par. Even for the losing shareholders, the whole battle is likely a sign of trouble ahead for their company.

Let's face it: A month ago, few of us knew that 3Par existed. I remember the company from a decade ago doing data storage up in Seattle. That was about it. I didn't even know it was still around -- let alone that the company would be so sought after.

Most of the market was in my camp, which is why the stock was trading around $10. In the days after Dell's $18 bid for 3Par, there were snickers about the steep price they were paying -- a whopping 80% premium, which made Intel's(INTC - commentary - Trade Now) recent take-out of McAfee (MFE - commentary - Trade Now) at a 60% premium seem like a bargain.

That 80% premium for 3Par has turned into a 200% premium with HP's most recent bid. Most of us don't know too many 200% bids, so we have no basis for comparison. We do know, however, that most 50%-plus premium acquisitions end up destroying value at the acquiring firm.

I don't know 3Par's product offering in depth, but it seems clear that Dell is motivated to do the deal in order to beef up its storage offering to compete with International Business Machines (IBM - commentary -Trade Now), EMC Corporation (EMC - commentary - Trade Now) and Hewlett-Packard, while HP is trying to keep Dell on the outside looking in.

Some have said that 3Par is a "pimple" for both HP and Dell, meaning that the company is so small that it doesn't matter that each is paying so much. That's really not true. They've both got 3Par up to a $2 billion market cap, giving it a cool 236x enterprise value-to-EBITDA ratio. That's not insignificant for a $90 billion HP and a much smaller $23 billion Dell. Also, remember that HP has only $14 billion of cash and Dell has $12 billion of cash. 3Par will be meaningfully dilutive to whichever company wins.

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Wednesday, November 04, 2009

What Galleon Teaches Us

By Eric Jackson
11/04/09 - 06:00 AM EST

Stock quotes in this article: AMD , INTC , IBM

The government's case against Raj Rajaratnam, founder of hedge fund Galleon Group, on the charge of insider trading alleges that the hedge fund manager's primary competitive advantage for investors was a web of connections close to or inside technology companies feeding him illegal tips on future directions of the companies' stock prices.

What's shocking is how Rajaratnam is accused of having, over at least 10 years, cultivated a network of insiders feeding him nonpublic information about future earnings announcements from public companies like AMD(AMD Quote) (including its former CEO), IBM (IBM Quote) Intel(INTC Quote) and some of their most prestigious advisers like McKinsey & Co.

Why would so many bright, high-ranking people at such successful companies get caught up in such activities? Perhaps they craved access to a man whom Forbes recently ranked as the 262nd richest American, worth $1.8 billion and in the top 40 of hedge fund managers.

In a recent PBS "Frontline" episode on Alan Greenspan, the program made the allegation that the former Federal Reserve chief and acolyte of free marketer Ayn Rand had once joked with former head of the CFTC, Brooksley Born, that the two of them would never get along because she believed in prosecuting capital markets crimes and he didn't. He supposedly went on to explain that his strong faith in free markets made him believe that it was unnecessary to go after white-collar criminals through any kind of enforcement program.

Instead, Greenspan believed that market participants would ferret out ill-gotten gains and punish those people for their crimes by starving them of future capital. Such efficiencies would likely occur before the governmental regulatory body even knew something nefarious was going on.

Although I'm a proponent of unencumbered free markets, this point of view, whether Greenspan held it or not, is laughable. Bernie Madoff has blown this argument out of the water. And now we have the case of Rajaratnam, his decade old hedge fund, and his alleged 10 years of generating alpha through profiting on illegal insider information.

As a hedge fund manager, I look positively on this development. If illegal activity is going on by fund managers, it deserves to be highlighted and prosecuted. Investors will learn to ask tougher questions as part of their due diligence, and capital will ultimately flow away from managers posting false performance numbers to those who are truly generating alpha.

The hedge fund industry has to be one of the most Darwinian industries of any in the world. You don't get to keep your job by being the boss' son or being friendly with the right managers above you. You get to keep your job (and paid well if you do it consistently) by beating the market. You lose your job otherwise.

Perhaps because of the big potential rewards for success, it shouldn't be surprising that some aspiring and existing managers would try to bend the rules to get or stay on top. What this case shows is that ethical managers and investors are better off with a strong enforcement office at the SEC. The industry itself is not going to highlight the next cheater and investors -- even very sophisticated ones -- cannot do this themselves.

I know many hedge fund managers who've expressed mixed feelings about the Galleon case. They're happy that illegal activities by their competitors are being halted, but they worry the case will inspire more unnecessary red tape and heavy-handed oversight. The SEC is faced with a challenge in keeping ahead of the latest and greatest tricks employed by some managers to gain a performance edge.

However, the agency appears to have been pretty creative in coming up with some ways of identifying and tracking alleged illegal behavior in the Galleon case. Hopefully, it will begin to hire more people in the enforcement division with real-world Wall Street experience and not just more bureaucratic lawyers, as was criticized by Harry Markopolos in the Madoff case.

There's been a lot of discussion of getting hedge funds to register with the SEC as an important way for the agency to keep tabs on the potential risk these funds pose to the financial system. It's important, therefore, to realize that Galleon was registered -- its assets under management at one point last year topped $3 billion. More budget resources targeted towards enforcement would be taxpayer money better spent than registration for registration's sake.

Finally, a word of caution on the Galleon case. Although criminality ought to always be prosecuted to the fullest extent, Galleon and Rajaratnam deserve the right to defend themselves in court. What if they are innocent, after having announced they would be winding down the firm two business days after news of the arrests first broke? Could they ever truly be made whole by the SEC if that happened? That Orwellian possibility should send shivers down the spines of hedge fund managers everywhere.

Mark Cuban has never run a hedge fund, but what if he had when the SEC came after him last year for purportedly trading on insider information in the small-cap stock Mamma.com? If he'd had a hedge fund at the time, it likely would have also had to be wound down when details of his arrest first emerged. The SEC later dropped the charges, although it recently made some noise about bringing them back.

Wrong-doing deserves to be regulated and prosecuted by the SEC. The government should devote more resources to enforcement with the best qualified people involved. A few correct convictions will have a ripple effect throughout the hedge fund industry and discourage illicit behavior.

However, the SEC needs to realize it is playing with people's lives and livelihoods here. Investors will -- understandably -- redeem first and ask questions later when the agency launches actions against a fund or fund manager. They have a responsibility to do their jobs to the best of their abilities, as do hedge fund managers and senior executives within public companies.

Jackson's fund holds no positions in the stocks mentioned.

Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.

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Friday, September 11, 2009

BusinessWeek: Investing in Technology M&A

Posted on September 10

By Aaron Pressman

The conventional wisdom used to be that investors should run from technology companies that did too many mergers and acquisitions. But over the past decade, a group of top-tier tech wheelers and dealers has emerged that increased shareholder value with their acquisitiveness. Companies such as Oracle, IBM, and Adobe Systems have successfully used acquisitions to get into new lines of business, 0910_hands.jpg expand their customer bases, and grab hot new technologies. Still, some companies consistently overpay or buy yesterday's big breakthrough. An informal survey of tech fund managers, analysts, and consultants yielded a list of companies investors will likely favor on more deal news—and a few they may shun.

Related Story: Oracle Has Customers Over a Barrel
Video: Investing in Tech Giants

Once mainly a hardware vendor of computers large and small, IBM (IBM) has used a sharp acquisition strategy to expand into software and information technology services. After a string of successful additions, including performance management software maker Cognos, and Rational, which makes tools to help programmers write code, IBM announced in July it would pay $1.2 billion for SPSS, a leading developer of software to analyze statistical data. "All the software acquisitions have helped shift the company toward higher margins and faster growing areas," says Ken Allen, manager of the T. Rowe Price Science & Technology Fund. IBM was his 15th largest holding as of June 30.

Salesforce.com (CRM) has always been a poster child for the move from desktop applications to Web-based products. As more computing and data storage have migrated to online servers—the clouds in "cloud computing"—Salesforce has used a series of small acquisitions to keep pace. In 2006 it grabbed wireless software developer Sendia, for example, helping make all its offerings available over mobile phones. "They're doing a good job of pushing each acquisition into their services," says Jeff Kaplan, founder of tech consulting firm Thinkstrategies.

Cisco Systems (CSCO) is the king of bolt-on acquisitions. In a typical deal, Cisco purchases a much smaller company, such as voice-over-Internet gearmaker Sipura, which it bought for $68 million in 2005. Then it uses its manufacturing smarts and sales force to promote cutting-edge products that often fit into existing lines of business. Cisco also uses purchases to diversify and get into new businesses. This year it added Pure Digital Technologies, maker of the Flip digital video camera. "Their goal is to become a larger player in the consumer electronics and networking business," says Ned Douthat, an analyst at Ockham Research in Roswell, Ga.

One company that Richard Parower, manager of the Seligman Global Technology Fund, says never quite makes the right deal at the right price is Microsoft (MSFT)—"the one glaring example of [tech companies] that can't do acquisitions." For example, Microsoft paid more than $6 billion for Web advertising company aQuantive, a price several investors say was far too high. And its on-again, off-again talks to buy Yahoo! have shareholders worried about another surprise deal. T. Rowe's Allen thinks "investors are still discounting the probability they'll do something so risky again." A Microsoft spokesman says: "We buy where it makes sense, where we can accelerate growth, and generally we buy companies early in their history."

Another loser, say investors, is mobile-phone manufacturer Motorola (MOT). "Remember Symbol Technologies and Good Technology, both acquired by Motorola?" says Eric Jackson, founder of Naples (Fla.) money manager Ironfire Capital. "They have disappeared off the face of the tech landscape." Motorola says it's pleased with both deals and notes that Good's programmers are central to building products that use Google's Android mobile-phone software.

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Wednesday, June 10, 2009

Microsoft R&D Hasn't Delivered

06/10/09 - 02:01 AM EDT

MSFT , AAPL , ORCL , IBM , GOOG , HPQ , PFE

Eric Jackson

A couple of weeks ago at the D7 Conference in Carlsbad, Calif., Microsoft(MSFT Quote) CEO Steve Ballmer boasted the software company could create a lot of new things by spending $9.5 billion annually on research and development expenses. That's right, Microsoft spends almost $10 billion each year on R&D. That's more than any other company in the world, by a long shot.

R&D spending at many tech, pharmaceutical or biotech companies is treated as motherhood and apple pie. R&D is never a bad thing -- it's only good. More is always better. When you invest in research, you are investing in hope and possibilities. No matter how much you have lost in past projects that never panned out, every new dollar invested in a R&D project holds the possibility that it will deliver a large multiple of that dollar in future earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.

Spending a lot on R&D would be a good thing for Microsoft if it was generating a large return from that investment. But that's not the case and it hasn't been the case for a long time.
Ballmer's comments show that Microsoft's senior leadership is proud of its continued investment in R&D and sees it as a source of competitive advantage for the company. On an absolute dollar comparison basis, Microsoft is making a much bigger bet than most in this area.

Microsoft spent 46% more than the $6.5 billion IBM(IBM Quote) invested in R&D last year, 252% more than Oracle(ORCL Quote) ($2.7 billion), 763% more than Apple(AAPL Quote) ($1.1 billion), and 390% more than Google(GOOG Quote) ($2.8 billion). Yet, most would conclude that Microsoft isn't 9 times as innovative as Apple, despite the discrepancy in how much money it is pouring into its research activities. Beyond its Office, Client, and Server core franchises, it's difficult to name innovations associated with Microsoft.

What is also remarkable about Microsoft's spending on R&D is the cumulative total racked up over the years. In the last 10 years, Microsoft has invested $62 billion in the R&D area. Microsoft could have bought back nearly 40% of its stock with that amount; it could have beefed up its dividend; it could have made a string of acquisitions which presumably would have continued to grow its top and bottom lines more than what it has achieved organically.

It's hard to know exactly what Microsoft has delivered for its R&D investment; it doesn't break out the numbers according to its five business segments. However, the two smallest business segments -- Entertainment & Devices, which includes the Xbox, Zune, and Windows Mobile software groups, and Online Services, which includes Search, and the Microsoft MSN, Hotmail, and Messenger properties - likely have taken the lion's share of the investment. Combined, these two divisions have delivered $71 billion in revenue for Microsoft over those 10 years and $15 billion in losses.

So, what Microsoft's $62 billion R&D investment has led to a $15 billion loss for at least those two businesses in 10 years.

Ballmer has argued that Wall Street investors are too focused on the short-term. One large Microsoft investor told me recently that Ballmer had complained loudly to him about the short-sightedness of investors who called on the company four years ago to do a large stock buyback and pay out a dividend with the excess cash on Microsoft's pristine Microsoft balance sheet.

Ballmer apparently said to this large investor: "We did everything they asked for. We did a huge buyback. We did the biggest one-time dividend ever. And what good did it do us?"

Ballmer's right. Total shareholder returns, or TSR, for Microsoft since it initiated its stock buyback and dividend program are down 25%. For the last 10 years, TSRs fell 47% (as of early April). This includes returns from dividend payments (including the big, one-time dividend of $3 a share), as well as stock appreciation, over that time.

Is 10 years a sufficient amount of time for a shareholder to wait to judge a company's management team for how it has performed? Those TSR numbers are clearly unacceptable and likely reflect poor investment decisions and loss of confidence by shareholders in the future prospects for the company.

Over that same 10-year time period (again, as of early April), Apple's total shareholder returns have been 826%, Nintendo's have been 243%, Oracle's have been 166%, IBM's have been 3%, and Nasdaq's returns have fallen 37% -- all substantially higher than Microsoft's TSRs.

If the predominant Microsoft strategy of investing more in internal R&D, steering away from acquisitions, and keeping tight control of the five business segments has led to these results in the last 10 years, should shareholders expect that the same approach will lead to different results in the next 10 years? Are we being "short-termists" or "flippers" of the stock by pointing out these results and suggesting they should have been much better?

R&D spending can lead to blockbuster returns. And Microsoft has a big advantage relative to its competitors in that it can invest enormous sums for future product development. But Microsoft, in being proud of the fact that it can spend almost $10 billion a year on R&D, is like a driller of oil and gas being proud of the fact that it can drill thousands of dry holes. It doesn't matter what you spend on R&D; it only matters what return you make from that investment for your investors. So far, Microsoft hasn't delivered on its promises.

A private-equity investor friend of mine once told me that he only liked investing in companies who practiced "small 'r' and large 'D' R&D" - meaning he wanted to see fewer ivory tower white coats and more of an emphasis on taking cutting-edge ideas and technologies out of the lab and building a real product and revenue stream around it. That process requires discipline, but it can be managed.

Microsoft isn't the first large company to face this challenge of effectively managing its R&D process. Hewlett-Packard (HPQ Quote) lost its way a few years ago. Pfizer(PFE Quote) and other "big pharma" companies are facing similar questions around their R&D activities.

Instead of patting Microsoft on the back for its continued spending on R&D, investors and the press should be asking, "Where's the beef?" The onus should be on the company's management to articulate why its status quo approach for running this function will lead to different results in the next 10 years. Otherwise, I can think of several better ways to spend the next $62 billion of cash flow.

At the time of publication, Jackson's fund held a long position in Microsoft.

Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.

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Monday, May 11, 2009

Hey Microsoft, Use Debt Sale for M&A

05/11/09 - 12:25 PM EDT

MSFT , CSCO , IBM , ORCL , SHLD , YHOO , GOOG

Eric Jackson

This morning brought news that Microsoft(MSFT Quote) will be selling five, 10-, and 30-year debt as soon as perhaps later today. This makes a lot of sense. Microsoft has been overly conservative in how it's managed its business since its founding, due to the personal biases of Bill Gates.

Investors couldn't complain in the early days, but the last 10 years have been grim from a shareholder-return perspective. Even when you count the dividends you've received as a shareholder Redmond initiated that program in the early part of this decade, you still have seen total shareholder returns of almost -50% from holding Microsoft for 10 years -- far below the Nasdaq and Microsoft's chief competitors like IBM (IBM Quote), Oracle (ORCL Quote) and faster-growing Apple (AAPL Quote) and Google (GOOG Quote). That's depressing for Microsoft investors and employees alike.

From a capital structure perspective, Microsoft's antipathy toward debt has always puzzled investors. Here is a dominant franchise, with perhaps the most pristine balance sheet in the world and a remarkable cash-generating ability, and yet it still keeps an enormous amount of cash on its balance sheet and refuses to use debt.

There are two open questions regards this debt issuance announcement: (1) How much debt will they issue? and (2) How will they use it?

If Microsoft's history holds, the amount of debt issued through this will be modest. They've indicated that the offering will be "benchmark" size, which indicates at least $500 million. If you compare the debt-to-cash ratios of larger peers Oracle and IBM, Microsoft should be looking to issue much more than that. Oracle has an equal amount of cash and debt, implying that Microsoft should look at taking their debt load to $24 billion. IBM uses debt even more aggressively. IBM's debt-to-cash ratio implies that Microsoft could take on $60 billion in debt easily.

If Microsoft does announce that it will raise a lot of debt, that news alone will likely send its shares lower. The market might figure it plans another high-ball offer for Yahoo! (YHOO Quote) or to take over Facebook at the $16 billion valuation Microsoft agreed to at their last round. How the market interprets the amount of debt Microsoft raises very much depends on how they will spend it.

Microsoft has begun buying back stock in the last five years and currently has an open plan to buy back an additional $40 billion in stock between now and 2013. For years, several Microsoft investors have called on the company to buy back stock as a way of reducing the amount of cash inefficiently sitting on its books to its investors.

Microsoft has obliged over the last five years, using about $100 billion in capital to pay shareholders dividends or buy back stock. Yet that strategy has led to total shareholder returns over that period of about -25%. To be fair to Microsoft, the simple strategy of dividending out cash to shareholders and buying back stock hasn't worked out for many companies over the last two years, as companies like Microsoft and Sears Holdings (SHLD Quote) have watched billions of dollars of their capital used to buy back stock at now-inflated prices.

Continuing to just buy back more stock is not the answer for Microsoft's low stock price. The company needs to give its investors a strategy for how it is going to grow. Investors are currently pricing in the likelihood that Microsoft will essentially run itself like a utility for the next 20 years -- as well as spend money in areas like search or the Zune, which will never return the capital spent. They believe Microsoft's top line will stay flat.

Microsoft management has given investors no reason to believe otherwise. We've heard little to excite us about the future growth of this company, more about its obsession with getting a deal done with Yahoo! and catching Google. That's not a corporate strategy.

The status quo isn't working at Microsoft. There needs to be a plan for growth at Microsoft, and it needs to involve acquisitions. The business press is littered with articles about how IBM, Oracle, and Cisco(CSCO Quote) will be using their strong balance sheets to pick off once-in-a-generation priced acquisitions in the next year -- yet Microsoft's name is never mentioned as another suitor. With its cash-generating ability and more capital from a debt offering, it should be in the mix.

To be successful in the long run, Microsoft needs people to green-light the best acquisitions and teams of people with the right skill sets to integrate them. Frankly, Microsoft hasn't shown it has either of those abilities. Microsoft investors don't need another expensive aQuantive deal or Facebook investment that smacks of desperation and has questionable long-term value for the company's shareholders. It needs to take a page out of IBM's and Oracle's playbook, though, and start doing deals to grow its top and bottom lines.

A big debt issuance, with a skilled acquisition team, and evidence of some exciting growth-related deals could suddenly show the market that this elephant can dance again.

TheStreet.com

At the time of publication, Jackson was long Microsoft.

Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.

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Wednesday, April 29, 2009

Betting on M&A Skills

We constantly hear about tech companies' strong balance sheets. While some, like Apple (AAPL) and Microsoft (MSFT), seem intent on building the largest pile of cash possible, others will no doubt use their cash to begin making acquisitions in the next year.

One lens to apply to your stock selection then should be judging a company's M&A purchase and integration skills. Some companies -- like Yahoo (YHOO) and EBAY -- have a track record of making lots of unrelated acquisitions at inflated prices (today we read about YHOO shutting down its 1999 GeoCities group because it's not competitive). EBAY is now in the process of unwinding itself from that failed approach and it's likely that things will change in this regard under Carol Bartz at YHOO.

When MSFT has made acquisitions (like aQuantive or its investment in Facebook), it's over-paid, giving the sense it's more desperate than thoughtful. Fears about its lack of M&A integration skills among its management team helped push investors to urge Ballmer to drop the YHOO bid last year.

The three tech companies who have proven themselves adept at making strategic deals at fair prices and then quickly integrating them into the fold are Oracle (ORCL), IBM, and Cisco (CSCO). There are more deals ahead for the sector and these companies have an edge for their shareholders in seeking out the best of what's for sale.

Position: Long MSFT.

Originally published in RealMoney.com on 4/24/2009 9:43 AM EDT

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Friday, April 24, 2009

IBM Has Real Underlying Strength

Even long-term "investors" who don't sell all their positions at the end of the day can't help but get sucked into the short-term price movements in the markets -- especially over the last 8 months, when you've had to from a risk management perspective. However, reaction to IBM's (IBM) initial earnings release last night and the performance of the stock today suggests why cool heads need to prevail.

When the numbers first came out last night, investors seized on the top-line revenue drop of 11% from a year earlier. The stock dropped from $100.43 to $97.30 initially after-hours. Market commentators immediately worried that shares would be under pressure this morning at the open. The did open down at $98.41 but, within 20 minutes, were back above the previous closing price. They're now trading up 1% this afternoon.

With more time, investors digested some important facts about IBM from the release and commentary: the overall revenue drop was only -4% before the dollar conversion, EPS and gross margins were both up from a year earlier period, they signed $12.5B in new services contracts in Q1 which will get recognized over time (building their book of business), and they paid a healthy amount into their pension reserves which will free up EBITDA in future quarters to drop to the bottom line. The CFO reiterated confidence in the rest of year's earnings too.

IBM is one of the best run tech companies these days. The shares are fairly cheap at a 10x forward P/E. It looks like a strong bet for the rest of the year and you get a small (2%) dividend for your troubles to boot.

My beef with the company is their R&D spending: it's $6.3B a year -- almost 3x the amount spent by Google (GOOG). This is still a company that's historically spent gobs of money in their labs (in the old spirit of Xerox PARC and AT&T Labs). Sometimes, it's led to blockbusters in innovation, but mostly it hasn't. It would be nice to see their batting average improve with less money spent.

Originally published in RealMoney.com on 4/21/2009 1:52 PM EDT

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Thursday, April 23, 2009

Oracle Wants Sun's Installed Base

It's fitting that IBM (IBM) and Oracle (ORCL) have been the ones fighting over Sun Micro (JAVA). Both have taken an aggressive approach to growing their top and bottom lines -- compared to, say, Microsoft (MSFT). The markets have rewarded growth over increased EPS as a result of retiring shares alone.

Sun Micro is a shell of its former self 10 years ago. It is simply being put to rest through this deal. For years now, it has struggled selling its older expensive OS (SPARC Solaris) in the face of Linux. Java has been popular but hasn't replaced that declining Solaris revenues.

Left alone, Sun would have continued to shrink. Why do ORCL and IBM want to buy them? Installed base. Both want those relationships which Sun has had for years so they can upsell new ORCL and IBM gear.

Sun's shareholders will ensure the deal gets done this time.

Originally published in RealMoney.com on 4/20/2009 7:56 AM EDT

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Thursday, December 21, 2006

IBM Ends Director Stock Options as Payment in favor of Retainers

A few weeks ago, we discussed Yahoo!'s policy of compensating directors and potential problems, as well as our suggestion of the importance of outside directors having "skin in the game." Today, the WSJ reports of IBM's decision to get rid of stock options in favor of paying directors a retainer. We agree with Professor Elson that stock ownership does better align directors with shareholders. The solution, again, is that directors be required to purchase meaningful amounts of stock themselves (not through grants) and then be paid in cash. Read more on our suggestions here. The full story is listed below.

IBM Ends Director Stock Options,Spotlighting Popular Perk's Decline

By JOANN S. LUBLIN and WILLIAM M. BULKELEY

December 21, 2006; Page A1

Stock options, long touted by many companies as a vital tool for rewarding board members and aligning their interests with those of shareholders, are falling out of favor as a perk amid scandal and accounting and legal changes.

Yesterday, International Business Machines Corp. said it no longer will grant outside directors stock options -- which give recipients the right to purchase company shares in the future at a set price. Instead, starting Jan. 1, those directors will be paid an annual $200,000 retainer, which they can take either in IBM shares or partly in cash -- though rules strongly encourage them to take the shares.

IBM is only the latest big company to abandon options -- which are worthless unless a stock price rises -- in favor of compensation involving cash, restricted stock or outright equity stakes that both rise and fall with the share price. The move by the iconic company underscores a broader repudiation of options for board members two decades after many companies began to embrace them -- and could even accelerate the trend because of IBM's reputation as a bellwether of corporate behavior. Among others that have dropped the practice in recent years are retailer Gap Inc., recruiter Heidrick & Struggles International Inc. and food company Tyson Foods Inc.

In 2001, as the stock-market boom of the 1990s crested, nearly eight in 10 big companies were giving their directors options, according to a proxy analysis of 350 major companies conducted for The Wall Street Journal by Mercer Human Resource Consulting in New York. By last year, the figure was down to 53%.

The percentage may drop to as low as 10% by 2010, because boards now consider options "somewhat problematic," said Charles Elson, head of the Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware's business school, and a director of two public companies. Abandoning options "reduces the controversy" because "any potential for manipulation just goes away," said Peter Gleason, chief operating officer of the National Association of Corporate Directors in Washington.

Options are suffering a heavy backlash after big corporate scandals such as the accounting frauds at Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc. and the more recent backdating scandal, corporate-governance experts said. In those and other cases, critics have claimed directors, motivated to boost returns on their stock options, turned a blind eye to problems.

The backdating scandal has revealed that dozens of companies altered their grant dates to days when their stock was trading at a lower price -- thereby boosting profits on options. More than 130 companies currently are under investigation for the practice in the biggest corporate-fraud probe in decades. An academic study released this week suggested that as many as 1,400 outside board members at 160 companies received questionable option grants, though the study didn't address whether they knew about it.

Companies also are responding to new accounting rules requiring options to be counted as an expense after more than a decade in which they weren't. Under proxy-disclosure rules that took effect for fiscal years ending after Dec. 15, moreover, businesses must reveal far more detail about the elements and costs of board compensation packages -- which could make options less attractive.

More broadly, post-Enron changes in laws and corporate practices have imposed greater demands on outside directors -- that is, those who have no other ties to a company. The New York Stock Exchange, for instance, now requires that a majority of board seats, and all compensation- and audit-committee members, be independent.

That has prompted plenty of discussion about how best to compensate outside directors and keep them focused on shareholder interests while protecting their independence. Outside directors are supposed to play a special role safeguarding against cozy board relationships with management.

"The overall governance thrust today is to have board members be [stock] owners rather than optionees," said Pearl Meyer, senior managing director of Steven Hall & Partners, a pay consulting firm in New York. Options focus recipients "too much on short-term movements in the stock price," she said.

Director compensation has been a subject of heated debate and experimentation for more than two decades. In the 1980s, corporate reformers and some large institutional investors argued that options would help motivate directors to focus harder on shareholder returns by giving them ownership incentives. The idea gained fuel thanks to tax and accounting policies that kept options tax- and expense-free, and the large fortunes that began to be made by companies going public in the early days of the 1990s boom.

According to Executive Compensation Reports, a newsletter that covered executive pay, just 1.6% of the nation's 1,000 largest companies gave directors some kind of stock in 1983. By 1994, nearly one in five did.

No one has suggested that IBM's directors received backdated grants. An IBM spokesman said the Armonk, N.Y., computer giant's action was consistent with its practice of "broadly reducing our reliance on stock options" as compensation for employees and officers.

IBM started expensing options in 2005 because of new accounting rules. But even before that, "we'd been saying we were reducing our reliance on equity compensation," he said. People familiar with the matter said IBM also believes options tend to make recipients more oriented toward short-term results than they are with other forms of compensation.

IBM said the additional cash compensation for directors is equal to the value of the stock options outside directors have been receiving; each year they were given 4,000.

Ironically, IBM's elimination of options increases the likelihood that outside directors will acquire sizable share stakes -- thanks to its substantial stock-ownership guidelines. The company pays 60% of these board members' annual retainer in a type of deferred stock known as "Promised Fee Shares," the latest proxy noted. Those shares are based on the market price of IBM stock. They accumulate dividends in the form of more Promised Fee Shares, and they can't be redeemed until retirement or departure from the board, at which time the director can receive either IBM stock or the cash equivalent.

Under IBM's corporate-governance guidelines, such directors are expected "to have stock-based holdings in IBM equal in value to five times the annual retainer," the proxy added. With the retainer doubled to $200,000, each outside IBM board member must now aim to own $1 million worth of shares.

The IBM spokesman said all the company's outside directors this year chose to invest all of their cash compensation in such shares. IBM directors include Lucio Noto, former chief executive of Mobil Corp.; James W. Owens, chief executive of Caterpillar Inc.; Kenneth I. Chennault, chief executive of American Express Co.; and Minoru Makihara, former chairman of Mitsubishi Corp. IBM Chairman and Chief Executive Samuel J. Palmisano is the only IBM employee on the board.

Recent years have seen companies take a wide range of approaches to compensating directors. Coca-Cola Co. earlier this year unveiled a plan to pay directors solely through annually allocated "equity-share units," which can't be cashed until three years have passed -- and then only if Coke posts compounded annual growth of 8% in earnings per share.

Similarly, Campbell Soup Co. board members will no longer get options as of Jan. 1. Instead they will receive an equal mixture of actual shares and cash, the big food maker disclosed in its latest proxy statement. "We have moved away from stock options as a form of compensation in part due to the change in accounting rules," a spokesman said.

When Heidrick & Struggles eliminated options for directors in 2002, it replaced them with restricted stock units, believing that "would better align the interests of the directors with our stockholders," its 2002 proxy said. In light of later controversy over options, "it looks like it was a wise decision," said Gerard Roche, senior chairman. "We're in a position where we don't have any worries" about director compensation.

Some companies eschew any stock-based compensation for directors at all. Those that pay outside directors only in cash include Alcoa Inc., Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and Sears Holdings Corp.

IBM won mixed reviews yesterday. "It's a welcome move" because options create incentives "that aren't in the interest of long-term shareholders," said Dan Pedrotty, head of the AFL-CIO's Office of Investment. But he said he wishes the company would go further and adopt a performance-share plan for directors. Union-sponsored pension funds have assets of about $400 billion.

But Mr. Elson, of the University of Delaware, said he was troubled by the move -- even though outside directors must hold a high multiple of their cash retainer in IBM shares. "To show continued confidence, you have to own stock over the long term" and also be partly paid in stock, he said. "You should increase your [stock] position over time."

Separately, American Tower Corp. said yesterday that directors and officers who received options at prices below the fair-market value on the legal grant date have agreed to "eliminate any benefit" by compensating the company in cash, or by canceling vested but unexercised options. The company will increase the exercise price of any unexercised options to the fair-market value. American Tower, a Boston-based owner of cellphone towers, said that the value of eliminating the benefit is $7.5 million.

American Tower said it plans to eliminate similar options benefits totaling $7.6 billion for three former executives.

American Tower has said that "there were a number of deficiencies in the company's stock option granting practices." Last month it restated results for 2005 to reflect a review of the options. A spokesman didn't immediately return calls seeking comment on the options issue or the names of the executives and directors involved.

--Charles Forelle contributed to this article.

Write to Joann S. Lublin at joann.lublin@wsj.com and William M. Bulkeley at bill.bulkeley@wsj.com

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