Showing posts with label TGT. Show all posts
Showing posts with label TGT. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 27, 2009

Ackman Vs. Target

05/27/09 - 12:07 AM EDT

TGT , WMT , COST

The much-anticipated annual meeting of retailer Target(TGT Quote) is Thursday and large shareholder Bill Ackman of Pershing Square has been in a long-running battle for the past several weeks to win five seats on the board.

Ackman has spent $10 million to $15 million of his own money on his campaign thus far. Although he's won over the support of two influential proxy advisory firms -- RiskMetrics and Proxy Governance -- he faces a daunting task in winning Thursday's vote. In its latest issue, Barron's magazine proclaimed that Ackman's campaign was "off-target," stating that "Ackman's initiative could be one of the worst-conceived efforts in recent years by an activist investor."

On Tuesday, Ackman pledged to retain his stake in Target for at least five years if he's elected to the company's board. He said his personal stake in Target is now worth more than $55 million.
Here's my view on the campaign.

A Review of the Fight

Ackman's Pershing Square has been a shareholder in Target for more than two years. In 2007, he opened Pershing Square IV, which was a fund solely dedicated to investing in Target. Pershing's funds own 3% of the stock outright with options to purchase at least another 2%, many of which are already in-the-money.

From very early on in his stock ownership of Target, Ackman has been an outspoken critic of the company. His calls for the company to unlock value in its real estate holdings date back to at least 2007.

Earlier this year, Ackman apologized to investors in Pershing Square IV after his option bets on Target had gone against him resulting in a drop in fund performance of 89.5% as of the end of January. Target management has used Ackman's option holdings to imply that he's more a short-termist than other investors and that his proposed changes are riskier.

Ackman's plan for Target consists of four parts: (1) unlock up to $40 billion in real estate value by placing the land under the stores in a real estate investment trust structure and then leasing back the land from the REIT; (2) sell the entire credit card operation; (3) improve the quality of the board of directors; (4) close the performance gap over time with Target's No. 1 competitor Wal-Mart Stores(WMT Quote).

Proxy Governance has supported Ackman's activist efforts and his full slate of nominees for Target's board. RiskMetrics, the more influential of the two proxy advisory firms, has recommended two of Ackman's five nominees (Ackman himself and Jim Donald, the ex-CEO of Starbucks(SBUX Quote)). Glass Lewis, another proxy advisory firm, has rejected Ackman's nominees and supports Target's full slate.

In the weeks leading up to Thursday's vote, Ackman has taken to the airwaves to make his case. He's an exceptional communicator. He's clear, thoughtful and forceful in making his case. I don't think there's a better activist investor currently practicing today when it comes to communication skills.

Target, for its part, also has been pushing its rebuttal to Ackman's criticisms, taking 10 minutes at the beginning of its most recent earnings call to cast doubt on the Pershing plan.

What's Worked With Ackman's Campaign

1. Target's performance has clearly lagged Wal-Mart's recently, and that's relevant. Barron's includes figures in its article that show Target's total three-, five- and 10-year returns vs. Wal-Mart, Costco(COST Quote), and the S&P 500. The results are through April 30, and cite Morningstar. The reported returns imply that Target's returns have been pretty good on a five and 10-year basis, even though they've lagged their peers in the last three years.

I was incredulous after reading this and so I went to Morningstar to revisit these numbers. What I found on its site tells a different story than the Barron's numbers. On the currently reported numbers (through May 22), Target's year-to-date, one-, three-, five- and 10-year returns all clearly lag their industry and the S&P, although the five and 10-year are roughly comparable with Wal-Mart).

2. This Target board is out of touch, like many corporate boards. There are many compelling points Ackman makes about how out of touch the Target board has become. Its directors currently own only 0.27% of the total Target shares outstanding. Many directors only hold shares given to them through options or equity grants. They've consistently relaxed the director tenure limits to allow directors like former Telstra CEO Sol Trujillo to serve up to 20 years on the same board.

Most corporate governance experts would tell you that a director no longer has "fresh eyes" to look at a company's issues and challenges after eight years on the same board. A two-decade term limit is outrageous. It's also ridiculous to hear that Target's nominating committee refused to meet with Ackman or his nominees about joining the Target board last year but paid themselves fees for sitting on this committee, even though that committee didn't meet once formally during the year. I can't recall seeing that in a recent large company proxy.

Target's board deserves a revamp. Its practices suggest a cozy group of insiders seeking to protect their job security as directors, rather than doing the right thing for shareholders. Things likely will change significantly in future boardroom battles, as last week the Securities and Exchange Commission threw its support behind "proxy access," which would make it much less expensive to mount campaigns and give shareholders a real choice in who they want to represent them on the board instead of only choosing from the incumbent slate. If Target's board doesn't change Thursday, it most certainly will next year.

3. This is a legitimate campaign -- not a distraction. As the Barron's article stated over the weekend, there is no shortage of management apologists who come out of the woodwork when there is a dissident proxy fight. Most of the time these commentators who support the status quo usually complain that the company isn't the worst of the bunch and therefore an activist campaign is a waste of time and a distraction.

That approach has allowed mediocre boards to persist in this country for decades. As the points I've mentioned verify, this campaign certainly has merit. What's more, Ackman has paid his way to put it on. He has real "skin in the game" -- unlike most, if not all, of these kinds of critics. The fact is that if more mediocre boards had been "distracted" by legitimate activist campaigns over the past two years it's likely we'd have a much stronger capital markets system today than the one which absolved itself of any risk management responsibility.

4. Ackman's made a great case. I tip my hat to Ackman, including his spirited attack of the Barron's article, for being a very precise and skilled communicator. I think he's made about as strong a case as an activist can make at this time against Target.

What Hasn't Worked

1. Target's poor performance relative to Wal-Mart hasn't been compelling enough. It's hard to win an activist campaign arguing what Target should have done in the last few years. Shareholders are human. They take short-cuts, they summarize, they look for sound-bite logic for understanding a campaign, and then they base their voting decisions on this incomplete information. Some shareholders rely heavily on what the major proxy advisory firms say when deciding how to vote. Although Ackman's made some salient points on how Target has lagged Wal-Mart, he will not gain as much shareholder support as he could have if the gap had been much more compelling.

2. The REIT component of Pershing's plan doesn't match today's environment. A large part of Ackman's plan includes increasing shareholder value through creating a new Real Estate Investment Trust. It matters not that Target uses Richard Sokolov, the president of Simon Property Group (SPG Quote) (who competes against General Growth Properties, of which Ackman is a large owner), to discredit Pershing's plan. The optics of the plan don't match the current environment we're operating in even if the substance of the plan is on the mark. It will be difficult to convince many investors to take a leap of faith on a sudden creation of $40 billion in value from moving a few shells around. At the moment, skepticism reigns.

3. Jim Donald's communication skills haven't matched Ackman's. As RiskMetrics' recommendation confirms, there appears to be the most support for Donald as a second pick for the Target board after Ackman.

During a recent joint CNBC appearance, Donald, who also helped build Wal-Mart's grocery business before leaving for Starbucks, failed to match Ackman's oratory skills. When someone questioned Donald about what changes as a director he'd like to see Target make, he deferred, saying that he needed some time to study things in more depth. It was modest and diplomatic but not in keeping with a bloody-nosed proxy fight.

What's more, it played to what Target has tried to press -- that there's nothing that significant to fix at the company. It would be ideal if all shareholders took the time to review all candidates' utterances prior to forming their selections, but unfortunately sound bites matter, and that one hurt.

When all is said and done Thursday, I expect that Ackman will win two seats on the Target board, along the lines as RiskMetrics suggests. In the long run, it should greatly help Target's other shareholders and prove the naysayers wrong. Ackman hasn't run a perfect campaign, but it's been very effective, and he will consider it a success with this kind of outcome. It also will give him the chance to further press his views at the board level. It's likely that Thursday's showdown will be a preview of many more activist contests to come next year, once the new SEC proxy access rule goes into effect. Sleepy boards should get ready for more distractions.

At the time of publication, Jackson had no positions in the companies mentioned.

Eric Jackson is founder and president of Ironfire Capital and the general partner and investment manager of Ironfire Capital US Fund LP and Ironfire Capital International Fund, Ltd.

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Sunday, May 10, 2009

Cheering for Bill Ackman at Target (TGT)

I read Jesse Eisinger's great profile of Bill Ackman of Pershing Square in my final copy of Portfolio Magazine.

Bill took some shots when his Target (TGT)-only fund was down 93% earlier this year. He had to apologize to his investors, loosen the fund terms and injected $25 million personally into the fund. AG Andrew Cuomo even called Ackman up to compliment him for how he handled the situation.

The last I heard, Ackman's TGT-only fund's return was -50% -- still a big loss, but a remarkable achievement in a little over a month off the bottom. This jump corresponds with TGT's move from its early March bottom of $25 to around $40 today.

Ackman's results show how quickly a one-investment fund, combined with the use of options, can see performance dramatically increase (or decrease). (Ackman has already said he'll likely never do a single investment-fund again.) There is still a good chance that this formula will assure he returns all the original money to his investors and, who knows, maybe even return them a small profit.

I'll be cheering for Ackman. He's got ideas in spades, which is something the world needs more of these days. And, besides, who doesn't love a happy ending?

Position: None.

Originally published in RealMoney.com on 5/6/2009 1:37 PM EDT

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Thursday, April 23, 2009

CEOs and Other Execs Should Be Barred from Serving on Outside Boards

Where do current CEOs and even their underlings get the idea that it's a good idea for them to sit on another public company's Board of Directors?

This was a big beef I had with former Yahoo! (YHOO) CFO Sue Decker. Over the last two years of her tenure at Yahoo!, she received two promotions, going from CFO to eventually president (although she always referred to herself as Jerry Yang's "partner," which I assume means she thought of her job as co-CEO). With each promotion, she received increased responsibility and an increased number of direct and indirect reports to oversee.

The pressure on her and the rest of Yahoo!'s board and management to turn around the fortunes of the floundering Internet company remained intense -- yet, the stock collapsed. Through it all, Decker continued to serve on no less than three other public company boards: Costco (COST), Intel (INTC) and Berkshire Hathaway (BRK)). I asked her and Yahoo! Chair Roy Bostock at last August's annual meeting how they justified her spending what I calculated to be an extra 187 hours a year on different outside board and committee meetings (although I didn't factor in travel time to Omaha, Neb., and Issaquah, Wash.). Neither Decker nor Bostock really had an answer.

Bostock said the Yahoo! board was "proud" of Decker's associations with this other board. As a shareholder, I understood how these directorships were a benefit to her personally but didn't see how they were helping Yahoo!'s stock price. Decker left the company a few months ago when Carol Bartz was hired as the new CEO.

I recently was going over Citigroup's (C) board of directors from last year (before the bottom fell out on the company). I was stunned to see that Alcoa's (AA) then-CEO Alain Belda, Xerox's (XRX) CEO Anne Mulcahy and Dow Chemical's (DOW) CEO Andrew Liveris were all taking time out of their busy jobs to hobnob in NYC on that board.

In retrospect, shareholders for all three of these CEOs' companies should have been ringing the alarm bells when they saw this. These three companies' stocks are down 70% on average over the last 12 months. To make matters worse, Mulcahy also serves on the boards of Target (TGT) and Washington Post Company (WPO).

Let's be honest: The only reason these busy CEOs agree to serve on these other boards is vanity; it's not for the knowledge they glean or the social contracts they make. In this post-Sarbanes-Oxley world where directors have to slog through binders of risk disclosures and company updates, it makes no sense for any officer to sit on an outside public company board.

Not only does it hurt their own firms' stock prices, it hurts the stock prices of the companies on whose boards they sit. Did Liveris and Mulcahy really have enough time to go through the full extent of Citigroup's risk exposure last year? The composition of Citi's board is another story entirely.

Originally published in RealMoney.com on 4/20/2009 4:18 PM EDT

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